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I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
PLAINTIFFS’ CHOICES OF FORUM appear to be narrowingdue to the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions
on personal jurisdiction. These limitations are particularly prob-
lematic for aviation litigation because so many cases involve mul-
tiple parties based in different locations. For nearly three
decades, the Supreme Court struggled to produce a majority
opinion setting forth clear criteria for specific personal jurisdic-
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tion.1 However, its recent decision in Walden v. Fiore2 may have
finally broken the stalemate. Several recent aviation cases signal
the change. Meanwhile, the Court’s two recent decisions on
general jurisdiction3 have nearly eliminated general jurisdiction.
Sutcliffe v. Honeywell International, Inc.4 illustrates these phe-
nomena. Sutcliffe arose from the crash of a CASA C212-CC40
twin-engine aircraft in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. Plaintiffs, Ca-
nadian citizens, worked as crew members on the aircraft. They
brought suit in Arizona against several defendants in the manu-
facturing chain: Honeywell—the alleged successor to the engine
manufacturer, Garrett—and foreign corporations EADS Con-
strucciones Aeronauticas S.A. (EADS CASA) and Airbus Military
SL (Airbus), both alleged to be the aircraft manufacturers. The
plaintiffs were not alleged to have any connection with Arizona.
EADS CASA and Airbus, Spanish corporations with their princi-
pal places of business in Madrid, moved to dismiss on personal
jurisdiction grounds.5
Plaintiffs first attempted to establish general jurisdiction, cit-
ing numerous contacts between the Spanish defendants and Ari-
zona. However, the court noted that Arizona-related contacts of
unspecified entities affiliated or related to the defendants could
not justify general jurisdiction in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s rejection of an agency theory of general jurisdiction in
Daimler AG v. Bauman.6 More importantly, general jurisdiction
did not exist even if all the Arizona-based contacts by any Airbus-
related entity were attributed to the defendants because the
proper inquiry is whether the forum is the corporation’s place
of incorporation or its principal place of business and whether
the corporation is, in effect “at home,” not whether defendants’
contacts in the forum state are extensive in the aggregate.7
As for specific jurisdiction, the court applied the three-part
test announced by the Ninth Circuit in the wake of Fiore :
(1) the nonresident defendant must purposefully direct his activ-
ities or consummate some transaction with the forum or a forum
1 See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2782 (2011);
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 102 (1987).
2 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014).
3 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
4 No. CV-13-01029-PHX-PGR, 2015 WL 1442773, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2015).
5 Id. at *1–2.
6 Id. at *5 (citing Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 759–60).
7 Id.
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resident, or perform some act by which he purposefully avails
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum,
thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the
claim must be one [that] arises out of or relates to the nonresi-
dent defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of
jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice,
i.e., it must be reasonable.8
The court held that plaintiffs established purposeful availment
with respect to EADS CASA because it “purposely availed itself
of the rights and privileges of Arizona law” by purchasing the
engines from Honeywell in Arizona.9 However, the court was un-
persuaded that the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of those activities
because “arising out of” cannot be “the simplistic and sweeping
approach taken by the plaintiffs given the facts of record. The
causation element requires a more direct relationship between
the relevant forum contact, the mere purchase of the engines,
and the actual negligence claim brought against the moving de-
fendants.”10 Plaintiffs did not allege that purchasing the engines
in Arizona was a negligent act, nor did they allege that any of
the specific acts of negligence raised against defendants oc-
curred in Arizona.11
The court further concluded that personal jurisdiction over
these defendants would be unreasonable because it did not
comport with fair play and substantial justice. Applying the
seven reasonableness factors articulated in Terracom v. Valley Na-
tional Bank,12 the court concluded that exercising personal juris-
diction over them would offend the traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.13 The court also concluded that ad-
ditional jurisdictional discovery was not warranted because the
request for discovery would not reveal facts sufficient to consti-
tute a basis for either general or specific personal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the second amended com-
plaint as to Airbus and EADS CASA for lack of personal
jurisdiction.14
8 Id. at *6 (citing Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015)).
9 Id. at *7.
10 Id. at *8.
11 Id. at *7–8.
12 49 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 1995).
13 Sutcliffe, 2015 WL 1442773, at *8–9 (citing Terracom, 49 F.3d at 561).
14 Id. at *10.
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In a similar vein, the court in Rice Aircraft Services, Inc. v.
Soars15 relied on Fiore in dismissing claims of interference with
contract, interference with economic advantage, and defama-
tion, where the conduct at issue was not “expressly aimed” at the
forum state, noting that the plaintiff’s injury “must be ‘tethered
to [the forum state] in [a] meaningful way,’ and ‘the plaintiff
cannot be the only link between the defendant and the
forum.’”16
The court in Everett v. BRP-Powertrain, GmbH, & Co. KG17
reached the same result, rejecting jurisdiction over three of four
companies in the chain of manufacture and distribution of an
aircraft engine that plaintiff purchased at the Experimental Air-
craft Association’s Airventure Oshkosh airshow. Citing Fiore, the
court concluded: “That the engine was re-sold in Wisconsin may
have been foreseeable, but this does not demonstrate that Ko-
diak purposefully availed itself of the Wisconsin marketplace for
purposes of that transaction.”18
Another case illustrates the trend to restrict the use of general
jurisdiction. In Williams v. MD Helicopters, Inc.,19 plaintiff, a citi-
zen of the United Kingdom, brought suit in Michigan for inju-
ries sustained in the crash of an MD369E helicopter in the
United Kingdom. He brought product liability claims against
MD Helicopters, Inc. and Helicopter Technology Company for
design defects in the tail rotor of the helicopter, which plaintiff
alleged caused the crash. The court granted defendants’ motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the accident
occurred in the United Kingdom, plaintiff sought general juris-
diction over the defendants, but the court dismissed the com-
plaint because there was no showing that defendants had been
carrying on a continuous and systematic part of their general
business within the state. Plaintiffs were unable to distinguish
their claim from those in other recent cases in which general
jurisdiction had been rejected, most notably Daimler AG.20 How-
ever, the court denied summary judgment sought by another
15 No. 2:14-cv-02878-MCE-EFB, 2015 WL 8481609, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9,
2015).
16 Id. at *6–7 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122, 1125 (2014)).
17 No. 14-C-1189, 2015 WL 5254555, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 9, 2015), recons.
denied, No. 14-C-1189, 2016 WL 297464 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 20, 2016).
18 Id. at *14 (quoting Fiore, 134 S. Ct. at 1121); see also Boyce v. Cycle Spectrum,
Inc., No. 14-CV-1163, 2015 WL 8273463, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2015); Teva
Pharm. Indus. v. Ruiz, 181 So. 3d 513, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
19 No. 14-13787, 2015 WL 4546770, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2015).
20 Id. at *3 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014)).
148 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
defendant, Henkel Corp., which did not contest jurisdiction but
claimed that it had not been properly served under Michigan
law and that the statute of limitations had run.21
Brady v. Southwest Airlines Co.22 illustrates the restrictive effects
of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions as to both general and
specific jurisdiction. Plaintiff allegedly experienced severe tur-
bulence and sustained brain trauma while a passenger on a
Southwest Airlines flight from Ontario, California, to Las Vegas,
Nevada. During the turbulence, plaintiff’s seatbelt fitting alleg-
edly “failed and separated, causing plaintiff’s head to violently
strike the overhead storage bin.”23 The complaint alleged that
defendant Davis Aircraft Products manufactured the restraints
on the aircraft. Davis moved to dismiss, challenging personal ju-
risdiction. The Nevada court agreed. It noted that general juris-
diction requires defendant’s contacts to be “of the sort that
approximate physical presence.”24 Although Southwest Airlines
flies to and from Nevada, Davis had “no significant contacts with
Nevada aside from outfitting Southwest airplanes with parts.”25
Plaintiff argued that Davis manufactures aircraft safety parts for
large national and international customers like Southwest and
Boeing. He contended that it was “‘generally known’ that South-
west transports passengers all over the world and thus, Davis
knows that its products could travel anywhere in the country,
including Nevada.”26 However, “the Supreme Court has ex-
pressly rejected the argument that placing items into the stream
of commerce suffices for general jurisdiction.”27
The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim of specific jurisdic-
tion. Citing Fiore, the court noted that “the plaintiff cannot be
the defendant’s only connection to the forum state,” for it is
“the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connec-
tion with the forum state that is the basis for its jurisdiction over
him.”28 Davis contended that placing products into the stream
of commerce failed to provide a sufficient basis for specific juris-
21 Id. at *4–5.
22 No. 2:14-CV-2139 JCM (NJK), 2015 WL 4074112, at *1–2 (D. Nev. July 6,
2015).
23 Id. at *1.
24 Id. at *2 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d
1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2851 (2011)).
28 Id. at *3–4 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014)).
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diction, despite its knowledge of the distribution and use of its
products in so many locations. Davis responded that acceptance
of plaintiff’s argument would subject it to personal jurisdiction
anywhere its customers conducted business and that Davis could
not control or anticipate where its customers would do business.
The court concluded that “an out-of-state defendant can be
found to have purposefully availed itself of the forum only on
the basis of its own affirmative conduct directed at the forum.”29
It therefore concluded that the plaintiff had failed to identify
any conduct establishing purposeful availment and dismissed
the claim against Davis. The court denied leave to take addi-
tional jurisdictional discovery because the discovery sought by
plaintiff related to Davis’s relationship with Southwest, rather
than its relationship with Nevada.30
In Mullen v. Bell Helicopter Textron,31 defendant HLW Aviation
LLC, a Georgia company, allegedly leased a Bell 206L-1 helicop-
ter to T&M Aviation in Louisiana, which operated it under con-
tract with the U.S. Forest Service. It crashed in the DeSoto
National Forest in Mississippi, injuring the plaintiff, who was a
passenger. HLW moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. The court granted HLW’s motion. Plaintiff argued that it
was clearly foreseeable that the helicopter would be operated
over Mississippi because it had to be flown over that state to get
from Georgia to Louisiana. However, the court held that the de-
fendant’s contacts with the forum state could not be “random,
fortuitous, or attenuated, or the result of the unilateral activity
of another party or third person.”32 The court found jurisdiction
could not be sustained under the stream-of-commerce theory
because the product was no longer in the stream of commerce
when it undertook the flight in which the crash occurred.33
Davidson v. Honeywell International Inc.34 resolved similar issues
in a different fashion. Plaintiff was a crew member aboard a
Turbo Commander. While flying at 25,000 feet over the state of
New York, the aircraft suddenly began emitting clouds of oil
fumes and mist into the cabin. The pilot “initiated a rapid de-
29 Id. at *4 (quoting Abraham v. Agusta, S.P.A., 968 F. Supp. 1403, 1408–09 (D.
Nev. 1997)).
30 Id.
31 No. 1:15CV158-LG-RHW, 2015 WL 6755384, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 4, 2015).
32 Id. at *2 (alterations omitted) (quoting Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716
F.3d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 2013)).
33 Id. at *1, *3–5.
34 No. 14 Civ. 3886(LGS), 2015 WL 1399891, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015).
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scent to 8,000 feet to depressurize the aircraft” and then landed
safely.35 The complaint alleged that drops of lubrication oil
leaked from the engine into the bleed air-ducting system, caus-
ing the aircraft cabin to fill with smoke and fumes, seriously in-
juring plaintiff. The complaint alleged that defendant Fairchild
Controls manufactured the aircraft’s air cycle machine (ACM),
which was defective in design, manufacture, or assembly.36
Fairchild moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Fairchild was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Maryland. It also manufactured the ACMs in Mary-
land. Plaintiff attempted to establish personal jurisdiction in re-
liance upon a provision of the New York Civil Practice Laws and
Rules § 302 (a)(3)(ii), which authorizes jurisdiction over a non-
domiciliary who “commits a tortious act without the state caus-
ing injury to person or property within the state . . . if he . . .
expects or should reasonably expect the act to have conse-
quences in the state and derives substantial revenue from inter-
state or international commerce.”37 The court held that
whatever the intended reach of the statute, the Due Process
Clause limited the exercise of personal jurisdiction, and plain-
tiffs failed to show that their claim arose from or related to
Fairchild’s contacts with New York. Thus, for a New York court
to exercise personal jurisdiction, defendant’s “allegedly tortious
act must have had some relationship to New York.”38 Merely be-
ing aware “that one’s product or act may have effects in the fo-
rum state is insufficient.”39 Nor was it sufficient to show that
Fairchild manufactured parts for major aircraft manufacturers
such as Boeing and that it was foreseeable that a defect in such a
product would have consequences during flights, including a
flight over New York. However, rather than dismiss the claim
outright, the court transferred the case to the Southern District
of Texas under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), where Fairchild consented
to jurisdiction and venue.40
Carpenter v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.41 arose from the crash of a
Sikorsky MH-60M Black Hawk helicopter. The crash occurred in
Georgia while the aircraft was on approach. The crew-member
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at *2 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney 2008)).
38 Id. at *3.
39 Id.
40 Id. at *2–4.
41 101 F. Supp. 3d 911 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
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plaintiffs brought suit in California. They sued the Sikorsky de-
fendants for the design and manufacture of the pitch change
shaft and sued the BAE defendants42 for the alleged defects in
the seat. Both Sikorsky and BAE moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion. It held that
there was no general jurisdiction over either the Sikorsky or
BAE defendants because plaintiffs offered no evidence of any
contact with California related to the helicopter or the crash in
Georgia. Plaintiffs did not allege “that any part of the helicopter
was manufactured, designed[,] or maintained in California.”43
Plaintiffs proposed to transfer the case to the Southern District
of Georgia in the event the court had rejected personal jurisdic-
tion in California. The court noted that although a federal court
has the authority to transfer a case over which it lacks jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a), 1631, such a transfer
requires a determination that “the transferee court would have
been able to exercise its jurisdiction on the date the action was
misfiled” and that “the transfer serves the interest of justice.”44
In this case, plaintiffs made no showing of personal jurisdiction
over the BAE and Sikorsky defendants in Georgia. Plaintiffs
failed to meet the burden to demonstrate that Georgia had spe-
cific or general jurisdiction over them. Accordingly, the court
also denied the request to transfer.45
Lothrop v. North American Air Charter, Inc.46 arose from a crash
in Massachusetts after the engine lost power and the landing
gear hit electrical transmission wires during a forced landing.
Plaintiffs brought actions against a number of defendants, in-
cluding North American Air Charter, Inc. After a lengthy and
complex procedural history, during which other defendants set-
tled and the case was removed to federal court for the second
time, North American moved to dismiss for lack of personal ju-
risdiction. Plaintiffs first argued that North American had
waived its defense for lack of personal jurisdiction by participat-
ing in the litigation. It had participated by “filing a notice of
removal, opposing remand, answering the complaint, stipulat-
ing to the dismissal of defendants, opposing Lothrop’s motion
42 The BAE defendants are BAE Systems, Inc., BAE Systems Simula, Inc., and
BAE Systems Aerospace & Defense Group, Inc. Id. at 916.
43 Id. at 923.
44 Id. at 922 (quoting Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d
1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008)).
45 Id. at 916–18, 922–24.
46 95 F. Supp. 3d 90 (D. Mass. 2015).
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to admit an attorney pro hac vice, filing the motion to strike, stip-
ulating to a change of venue, and assenting to [another] motion
. . . .”47 Lack of personal jurisdiction was an affirmative defense
in the answer.48
The court denied plaintiffs’ motion, noting that although the
litigation “ha[d] already seen the expenditure of significant ju-
dicial resources, the action [wa]s still in a preliminary pos-
ture.”49 The entire focus had been on determining the
appropriate forum and the status of the claims; no action had
been taken on the merits. Plaintiffs also argued that even if
North American was “not subject to personal jurisdiction in Mas-
sachusetts on its own account,” the court could exercise “per-
sonal jurisdiction over North American because it [wa]s the
alter-ego of another company, Air Hamptons.”50 Air Hamptons
operated the aircraft that crashed in Massachusetts and had
flown in and out of Massachusetts over fifty times between 2007
and when the crash occurred in 2010.51
The court acknowledged that plaintiff had shown a “strong
relationship” between the two companies but failed to demon-
strate a sufficient disregard of the separate corporate forms to
justify treating the two corporations as a single entity. Plaintiff
established that the two companies shared employees and ser-
vices, but there was no evidence showing that one corporation
controlled or used the other corporation, aside from doing so
for the mutual benefit of both. Although they shared the same
physical space, phone number, and email addresses, there was
no showing that this created any confusion in record keeping,
nor that it confused other companies or individuals interacting
with them. Nor was there any “evidence about the capitalization
of either corporation, improper segregation of separate business
records or finances, or any improper use of the corporations’
funds.”52 The court found “no evidence, or even an allegation,
that the corporations were used in promoting fraud,” and so it
rejected plaintiff’s alter-ego theory.53 Accordingly, the court
47 Id. at 97.
48 Id. at 93–97.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 97–98.
51 Id. at 98–99.
52 Id. at 102.
53 Id.
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granted North American’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.54
JB Aviation v. R Aviation Charter Services, LLC55 arose from de-
fendants’ purchase of a Gulfstream Model GIV. Plaintiff alleg-
edly acted as the defendants’ broker for the transaction, then as
project manager for securing the Gulfstream’s status as airwor-
thy and was promised the role of chief pilot thereafter. How-
ever, defendants later informed plaintiff that they had hired two
other pilots for the Gulfstream, that plaintiff would not be re-
tained as chief pilot, and that they would not pay him for his
services as project manager. Defendants, Florida residents, chal-
lenged personal jurisdiction in New York. The court upheld per-
sonal jurisdiction over one defendant based on the brokerage
agreement because there were ample facts that the defendant
had come to New York on multiple occasions related to this
transaction. However, the court lacked jurisdiction over the
other defendant, which did not come into existence until after
the agreement had been executed. The court also found that it
lacked jurisdiction over the claims related to the Project Man-
agement Agreement because there was no evidence that the
Florida defendants negotiated in or traveled to New York for any
purpose related to that contract nor that the two agreements
were sufficiently related to each other. Defendants moved to
transfer the action to the Southern District of Florida under ei-
ther 28 U.S.C. §§ 1631 or 1404(a), but the court denied their
motion.56
In Broadus v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,57 the plaintiff was injured
while boarding a connecting flight from Atlanta, Georgia, to
Florida that originated in North Carolina. She filed suit in
North Carolina, her home state. Delta moved to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction. It conceded that it conducted business
in North Carolina and that the plaintiff purchased a round trip
ticket from and to North Carolina from Delta. But Delta chal-
lenged the second prong of specific jurisdiction, contending
that the claim did not result from injuries arising out of or re-
lated to Delta’s contacts with North Carolina because the spe-
cific events relating to the accident occurred in Atlanta. Plaintiff
asserted that it would be an extreme hardship for her to litigate
54 Id. at 102–04.
55 143 F. Supp. 3d 37 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
56 Id. at 41–49.
57 101 F. Supp. 3d 554 (M.D.N.C. 2015).
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the case in Atlanta where she had no other connections and that
her trip originated in North Carolina. The court concluded that
“[t]he round-trip [ticket] and the departure from Greensboro
were the genesis of this dispute.”58 As a result, “Delta should
have anticipated that, as a common carrier promising to pick
Broadus up in North Carolina and return her there, it could be
haled into a court in North Carolina, the state of her initial de-
parture and final arrival, for injuries inflicted on her during the
trip,” for her “injuries arose directly out of, and [we]re closely
related to, Delta’s connection to North Carolina.”59 Accordingly,
the court denied Delta’s motion to dismiss and, for similar rea-
sons, denied its motion to transfer the action to Georgia.60
In Seegar v. Anticola,61 plaintiffs, husband and wife, were travel-
ing on business to Delaware. The husband’s employer was a New
York corporation and plaintiffs were citizens of New York. Plain-
tiffs sued various New York defendants in Delaware, alleging
negligence in the operation, inspection, and fueling of the air-
craft. The aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania, allegedly because of
fuel starvation while traveling from Delaware to Buffalo, New
York. The New York defendants moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The court denied the motion. In addition
to finding personal jurisdiction under Delaware law, the court
also concluded that exercise of such jurisdiction did not offend
due process. The New York defendants directed the flight to
and from Delaware, including a planned refueling stop in Dela-
ware, and they allegedly conducted a negligent pre-flight inspec-
tion in Delaware. These constituted sufficient minimum
contacts to support personal jurisdiction. The court also ad-
dressed the convenience of the New York defendants and plain-
tiffs having to travel from and to New York; Delaware’s interest
in the promotion and enforcement of aviation safety; and Dela-
ware’s interest in an efficient resolution of the controversy that
also involved the unchallenged jurisdiction over a Delaware de-
fendant and the likelihood of multiple lawsuits if they were not
heard in one forum.62
Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines63 arose from an earlier product
liability lawsuit arising from the crash of a single-engine aircraft.
58 Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 558, 560–62.
61 No. 13-2030-LPS, 2015 WL 1149537, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 12, 2015).
62 Id. at *1–2, *5–6.
63 No. 15-19(DSD/LIB), 2015 WL 2165798, at *1 (D. Minn. May 8, 2015).
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In that lawsuit, plaintiff sued Lycoming in Minnesota state court
and hired Seader, an aircraft mechanic, to investigate the crash.
Seader prepared a report, opining that the aircraft’s engine
failed mid-flight as a result of a defect in the Lycoming fuel
pump. He relied in part on test data from Aero Associates, Inc.,
“a North Carolina company that manufactures fuel pumps in
competition with Lycoming.”64 The president of Aero, Timothy
Henderson, was asked to review and comment on Seader’s re-
port, on which he “took issue with Seader’s methods and dis-
agreed with his findings.”65 Lycoming moved to exclude Seader
as an expert witness and used an affidavit from Henderson in
support of the motion. Though the state court denied Lycom-
ing’s motion to exclude, it did prohibit Seader from giving ex-
pert engineering opinions. An attorney for Aero wrote to Seader
criticizing his report and stating that Aero had been “dragged
into” the Minnesota lawsuit and incurred damages. Aero
threatened to sue Seader personally if he failed to withdraw his
report. The attorney wrote the letter in North Carolina, mailed
it to Seader in Colorado, and copied it to Lycoming’s lawyer in
Minnesota.66
Plaintiff then sued Henderson, Aero, and Lycoming in federal
court, alleging that defendants, through the letter, “substantially
interfered with Mr. Seader’s ability to provide expert testimony
free from fear,” although “Seader ha[d] not refused to testify in
state court nor indicated that he [would] limit or change his
testimony as a result of the letter.”67 Plaintiff alleged claims for
tortious interference with contract, civil conspiracy, and inten-
tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants
moved to dismiss. The court granted defendants’ motions to dis-
miss for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The
court found that the conduct concerning the letter, “sent on
behalf of a North Carolina resident and corporation to a non-
party citizen in Colorado,” was insufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction in Minnesota over Aero and Henderson.68 Neither
Henderson’s appearance in Minnesota by submitting an affida-
vit in the state action, nor Henderson or Aero’s communications
with Lycoming in connection with the affidavit, provided suffi-




67 Id. at *2 (alterations omitted).
68 Id. at *3.
156 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
not pertain to harm arising out of Aero and Henderson’s lim-
ited participation in the Minnesota action. The dispute arose
out of the letter and an alleged conspiracy to preclude Seader’s
testimony.69
The court also rejected subject matter jurisdiction because
plaintiff failed to plead adequately an amount in controversy
greater than $75,000. Plaintiff alleged that because of the size of
the state lawsuit he would be required to obtain experts whose
fees will exceed $75,000. Plaintiff also alleged that if Seader
failed to testify or withdrew his report, plaintiff would have to
retain a substitute expert or would likely lose the case, and ei-
ther would result in damages greater than $75,000. However,
since plaintiff did not allege that Seader had limited his testi-
mony or withdrawn his report, nor that the letter reduced any
pecuniary value of his testimony, plaintiff “[could not] establish
the required jurisdictional amount by pointing to speculative
damages based on theoretical harm.”70 Nor were conclusory al-
legations of severe emotional distress sufficient to establish the
jurisdictional amount under a preponderance of the evidence
standard. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.71
In Lubin v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,72 plaintiff was a passenger on a
Delta flight from Memphis, Tennessee, to Boston, Massachu-
setts, and was injured when walking down the stairs of the air-
craft while deplaning in Boston. She sued Delta Air Lines,
Comair (a subsidiary of Delta), and Pinnacle Airlines in Missis-
sippi state court. Defendants removed the action to federal
court and plaintiff amended to add the aircraft manufacturer,
Bombardier, as an additional defendant. Bombardier moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the
motion. It held that Mississippi’s long arm statute did not pro-
vide a basis for jurisdiction. Although plaintiff purchased her
airline ticket in Mississippi, this did not provide a basis for juris-
diction over Bombardier, which was not a party to the contract.
Furthermore, because the injury occurred in Massachusetts,
rather than Mississippi, the tort did not occur in Mississippi, and
so the court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.73
69 Id. at *1–4.
70 Id. at *4.
71 Id. at *4–6.
72 No. 3:14-cv-648-CWR-FKB, 2015 WL 4611759, at *1 (S.D. Miss. July 31,
2015).
73 Id. at *1–4.
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II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In Flylux, LLC v. Aerovias de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.,74 plaintiff
brought suit in federal court, alleging that (1) it was engaged in
the business of making travel arrangements on behalf of its cli-
ent; (2) it had made thirty-three reservations for Aerovias de
Mexico (AeroMexico) clients from the United States, Argentina,
and Australia and paid for them; and (3) AeroMexico had can-
celled the reservations without warning. Consequently, the pas-
sengers were denied seats when they showed up to the airport.
Plaintiff sought damages of more than $400,000. Defendant
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial
court granted the motion, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Plaintiff did not specifically plead a contract between itself and
defendant. At best, plaintiff was an agent of its clients’ transac-
tions, and for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, each client
was required to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.
Because no such showing was made, the court lacked
jurisdiction.75
In Williams v. Perez,76 plaintiff sought whistleblower protection
under the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act
for the 21st Century (AIR 21) after United Airlines allegedly re-
taliated against him. He initially filed a lawsuit in federal court,
but the court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction “be-
cause AIR 21 d[oes] not create a private right of action.”77 He
then filed a complaint with the Department of Labor, but he
missed the filing deadline, so the Department of Labor denied
his complaint. A federal circuit court upheld the denial. Plaintiff
then brought a pro se action against the Secretary of Labor for its
handling of his claim. The court held that because of the exclu-
sive remedial scheme in AIR 21, it did not have jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s claim; the court could only enforce an order by the
Secretary of Labor. In this case, plaintiff was not seeking to en-
force any order but rather was challenging the actions of the
Department of Labor. Nor could plaintiff rely on the general
judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) because AIR 21 establishes a scheme of judicial review
74 618 F. App’x 574 (11th Cir. 2015).
75 Id. at 576–79.
76 110 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-5228, 2016 WL 520265 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 1, 2016) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2012)).
77 Id. at 2.
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and the APA only applies when there is “no other adequate
remedy.”78
III. REMOVAL
A. FEDERAL OFFICER REMOVAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1442
Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co.79 arose from the Asiana Airlines crash
of a Boeing 777 on July 6, 2013. It landed short at San Francisco
International Airport after flying across the Pacific Ocean from
Seoul, Korea. Plaintiff brought suit against Boeing in Illinois
state court. Boeing removed the action on the basis of admiralty
jurisdiction and on the basis that Boeing acted as a “federal of-
ficer” in approving the aircraft systems at issue. The trial court
rejected both arguments on the basis that Boeing was not a fed-
eral officer for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and that the tort
occurred on land when the aircraft hit the sea wall, not over
navigable waters. Boeing appealed under § 1442 as a putative
federal officer. The Seventh Circuit rejected Boeing’s conten-
tion that its delegated authority to assess and certify the airwor-
thiness of its products gave it federal officer status for purposes
of removal. The court concluded that “being regulated, even
when a federal agency ‘directs, supervises, and monitors a com-
pany’s activities in considerable detail,’” is insufficient to trans-
form a private firm into a person “‘acting under’ a federal
agency.”80 The court acknowledged Boeing’s argument that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provides “real delega-
tion” to aircraft manufacturers by transferring some of the
FAA’s inspection and certification functions, but the court con-
cluded that this was “still a power to certify compliance, not a
power to design the rules for airworthiness.”81 Under Watson v.
Philip Morris Companies, rulemaking, rather than rule compliance,
was the key criterion, and evidence of the FAA’s delegation or-
der was insufficient because it did not authorize Boeing to
change substantive rules.82
However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s re-
mand order, finding that the cases were removable because the
events leading to the accident comported with traditional mari-
time activity. Admiralty jurisdiction “has been fraught ever since
78 Id. at 1–4.
79 792 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2015).
80 Id. at 809 (quoting Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 145 (2007)).
81 Id. at 810 (emphasis in original).
82 Id. at 807–10 (citing Watson, 551 U.S. at 145).
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Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland[83] modified the former
situs requirement and asked[ ] not where a wreck ended up
(land or water), but whether the events leading to the accident
ha[d] enough connection to maritime activity.”84 Asiana flight
214 was “a trans-ocean flight, a substitute for an ocean-going ves-
sel,” like contiguous U.S. flights to and from Alaska, Hawaii, and
overseas territories are, which met the Executive Jet standard be-
cause such flights bore a “significant relationship to a traditional
maritime activity.”85 Moreover, the court held, consistent with
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,86 “that an accident caused by
problems in airplanes above water should be treated, for the pur-
pose of [the Death on the High Seas Act], the same as an acci-
dent caused on the water,” implying that “the general admiralty
jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) also includes accidents
caused by problems that occur in trans-ocean commerce.”87 The
Seventh Circuit pointed out that “[a]dmiralty then supplies a
uniform law for case[s] that otherwise might cause choice-of-law
headaches.”88 The court concluded that § 1333(1) supplies ad-
miralty jurisdiction, so plaintiffs, like many of the crash victims,
could have filed these suits directly in federal court. “If the sav-
ing-to-suitors clause allows them to stay in state court even after
the 2011 amendment, they are free to waive or forfeit that
right—which given the scope of § 1333(1) concerns venue
rather than subject[ ]matter jurisdiction.”89
The court reached the admiralty jurisdiction question not-
withstanding plaintiff’s argument that the court should have de-
clined to consider the question at all after it determined that
Boeing was not a federal officer. The sole basis on which the
remand order was appealable was that the case had been re-
moved on the basis that Boeing was acting as a federal officer
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Once the court rejected that argu-
ment, plaintiffs argued that the court simply should have re-
manded the case. However, the court concluded that the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides that appellate
review of an order remanding the case pursuant to § 1442 “shall
be reviewable by appeal or otherwise,” indicates that once the
83 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
84 Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 813 (citations omitted).
85 Id. at 816 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. 249).
86 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
87 Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 816 (citing Offshore Logistics, Inc., 477 U.S. 207).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 818.
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order was reviewable, the court of appeals is authorized to take
the time necessary to determine the proper forum, and the mar-
ginal delay from adding an extra issue is likely to be small.90 The
court acknowledged that some litigants might allege § 1442 friv-
olously as a basis for removal simply as a hook to allow appeal of
a different issue. However, the court concluded that frivolous
removals are sanctionable, and courts have other tools to sanc-
tion improper removals and interlocutory appeals. Accordingly,
the Seventh Circuit reversed and allowed the case to proceed in
federal court.91
Following the decision in Lu Junhong, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois remanded Brokaw v. Boeing
Co.,92 which arose out of the crash of a National Airlines flight
shortly after takeoff from Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. The
court also held that the three federal defenses raised by Na-
tional were not colorable under the facts alleged: the Defense
Base Act, the Political Question Doctrine, and the Combatant
Activities Doctrine.93
In Boyd v. Boeing Co.,94 plaintiff brought a mesothelioma case
against Boeing and United Technologies in state court based
upon alleged exposure to asbestos in the production of the
F100. As it did in Lu Junhong, Boeing removed the action based
upon 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Here, unlike in Lu Junhong, the
product at issue was a military aircraft.95 Boeing submitted an
affidavit showing that “the government exercised control over
all aspects of the production of the F100, including what warn-
ings were to be included on which parts.”96 As such, Boeing was
not allowed to “add, delete, or modify warnings related to th[e]
equipment,” and “the[ ] same restrictions applied to the rele-
vant manuals and related materials for the F100.”97 The court
held that this evidence was enough “to establish that Boeing was
acting under federal direction regarding actions [that]
[p]laintiffs claim[ed] caused or contributed to the injuries at
issue.”98 The court also concluded that, as required by
90 Id. at 810–11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d) (2012)).
91 Id. at 810–15.
92 No. 15 C 4727, 2015 WL 5915996, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2015).
93 Id. at *11, *14, *16.
94 No. 15-0025, 2015 WL 4371928, at *1 (E.D. La. July 14, 2015).
95 Id. at *1–2; see Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 807–08.
96 Boyd, 2015 WL 4371928, at *4.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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§ 1442(a)(1), defendants had shown that they had a “colorable
defense under federal law.”99 It was not necessary to prove the
asserted defense, but Boeing needed only to “articulate its ‘col-
orable’ applicability to the plaintiff’s claims” to justify re-
moval.100 Plaintiffs attempted to counter this contention by
disclaiming “any cause of action or recovery for any injuries
caused by exposure to asbestos dust that occurred in a federal
enclave” in “any cause of action or recovery for any injuries re-
sulting from any exposure to asbestos dust caused by any acts or
omissions of a party committed at the direction of an officer of
the [U.S.] government.”101 The court found this disclaimer in-
sufficient to defeat removal, noting that “[o]ne of the most im-
portant functions of this right of removal is to allow a federal
court to determine the validity of an asserted official immunity
defense.”102
B. REMOVAL BASED ON PREEMPTION
In Crown v. PHI Air Medical, L.L.C.,103 plaintiff’s lawsuit against
an air carrier was removed to federal court based upon the as-
sertion that the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempts state
law claims. The district court remanded the case, pointing out
that although the ADA may provide a defense to such a claim, it
does not constitute complete preemption, and therefore re-
moval was improper. The court further ordered that because
this issue was settled under the law of the circuit, plaintiff was
entitled to reasonable attorney fees. However, the court reduced
the attorney fees claimed by plaintiff, most notably pointing out
that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that the $135 per
hour billing rate for plaintiff’s counsel was reasonable and in
line with the hourly rates prevailing in the community for simi-
lar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experi-
ence, and reputation.104
In Baugh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,105 the complaint alleged that
plaintiff was blind and needed assistance in boarding, that Delta
failed to provide such assistance, and that plaintiff fell and in-
99 Id. at *4, *5.
100 Id. at *4.
101 Id. at *5.
102 Id. at *6 (citing Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387,
397–98 (5th Cir. 1998)).
103 No. 15-cv-10180, 2015 WL 3409010, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2015).
104 Id. at *1–4.
105 No. 1:14-cv-2551-WSD, 2015 WL 761932, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2015).
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jured herself. Delta removed the case because the claims were
allegedly preempted by the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA).
Plaintiff contended that her claim had been pleaded solely on
state law. The court held that when a complaint solely alleges a
state law claim, the action does not become removable simply
because federal law preempts that claim. Rather, removal is
proper only if such a claim is subject to complete preemption.
“Complete preemption is a narrow exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule and exists where the preemptive force
of a federal statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordi-
nary state law claim into a statutory federal claim.”106 The Su-
preme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
“have recognized complete preemption in only three federal
statutes: (1) the Labor Management Relations Act, (2) the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and (3) the Na-
tional Bank Act.”107 Complete preemption applies to those three
statutes since “all three ‘provide[ ] the exclusive cause of action
for the claim asserted and also set forth procedures and reme-
dies governing that cause of action.’”108 The court concluded
that the ACAA did not afford complete preemption even
though the ACAA and regulations promulgated pursuant to the
statute preempted the state law standard of care. Therefore,
they did not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction
either.109
C. FRAUDULENT JOINDER
Boeing attempted unsuccessfully to remove an employment
discrimination action in Reynolds v. Boeing Co.110 Plaintiff had
joined his direct supervisor as a non-diverse defendant. Boeing
deposed the seventy-six-year-old plaintiff, whose testimony sug-
gested that the supervisor’s comments about his age had been
sparse and benign. However, when submitting his errata sheet,
plaintiff contradicted his testimony and referred generally to nu-
merous derogatory and condescending comments, over a
lengthy period of time, that caused him to feel “terrible.” Plain-
tiff subsequently moved to remand. Boeing submitted a declara-
tion of the supervisor, who swore he never raised the subject of
106 Id. at *4.
107 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Dunlap v. G&L Holding Grp., 381 F.3d
1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004)).
108 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dunlap, 381 F.3d at 1291).
109 Id. at *2–4, *11–14.
110 No. 2:15-cv-2846-SVW-AS, 2015 WL 4573009, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2015).
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plaintiff retiring and discussed the issue only when plaintiff
brought it up. Plaintiff thereupon submitted yet another decla-
ration, which suddenly provided specific assertions with dates
and quotes. The court determined that in the context of a mo-
tion to remand, it should give plaintiff the benefit of the doubt
because of the presumption against removal, which differenti-
ated this type of potential “bamboozlement” from those when
raised in response to a motion for summary judgment. The
court held that the supervisor had not been fraudulently joined
and remanded the case.111
D. OTHER
In Bullar v. U.S. Specialty Insurance Co.,112 plaintiff was killed in
a parachuting accident. A wrongful death suit was filed against
the parachuting instructors and the company that employed
them (Mark and Archway). The trial court granted summary
judgment to plaintiff on liability and entered a $2 million judg-
ment against defendants. Plaintiff subsequently filed a direct ac-
tion against both defendants and their insurer (USSIC) under
Missouri’s Direct Action Statute, and defendants filed a cross
claim for bad faith against the insurer. USSIC removed the di-
rect action lawsuit to federal court; the co-defendants, Mark and
Archway, moved to remand. The court granted the motion.
Mark and Archway argued that they had not consented to re-
moval. USSIC argued that Mark and Archway’s consent was not
necessary because they had never been properly served. How-
ever, Mark and Archway provided evidence that prior to re-
moval, their attorney agreed to accept service on their behalf
and, therefore, the court held that consent was necessary. US-
SIC further argued that consent was not necessary because Mark
and Archway were merely “nominal defendants.” The court re-
jected this argument because the Missouri statute required join-
der of both the defendant and the insurance company and
further rejected USSIC’s argument that the court should realign
Mark and Archway as plaintiffs in accordance with their true in-
terests. However, based on Missouri case law, the court held that
realignment was inappropriate because they were necessary
party defendants to the action under the statute. Accordingly,
the court remanded the case.113
111 Id. at *1–5.
112 No. 4:15CV822 JCH, 2015 WL 4243438, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 13, 2015).
113 Id. at *1–3.
164 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
IV. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Lumenta v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.114 arose from a helicop-
ter crash on Dua Saudera Mountain in Bitung, North Sulawesi,
Indonesia. Plaintiff’s son, an Indonesian citizen, and seven
other passengers were killed in the crash. Plaintiff sued Bell,
Pratt & Whitney, and United Technologies in state court in Har-
ris County, Texas, alleging that the crash was caused by a defect
in the helicopter. Bell responded by alleging that venue was im-
proper in Harris County and moved to dismiss the case on fo-
rum non conveniens grounds, contending that the case should
be litigated in Indonesia. It argued that the wreckage, investiga-
tors, fact witnesses, maintenance flight logs, and plaintiffs were
all in Indonesia. Plaintiffs argued that the parties allegedly re-
sponsible for the crash and their witnesses were in the United
States. The trial court dismissed the case and the Texas Court of
Appeals affirmed.115 It noted as follows:
[I]t is undisputed that Lumenta, the plaintiff, is a citizen of the
Republic of Indonesia, as was the decedent; the crash occurred
in Indonesia; Indonesian officials conducted the investigation of
the crash and recovered the wreckage, which remains in Indone-
sia; the mechanics, who maintained the helicopter, and the
maintenance records, are in Indonesia; the Manado Airport em-
ployees, who tracked and communicated with the pilot of the he-
licopter, which crashed three minutes after take-off, are in
Indonesia; and the companies that owned, chartered, main-




The year’s most significant development in federal preemp-
tion came from Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,117 which had
rattled around in the U.S. district courts for years, including sev-
eral unsuccessful attempts at interlocutory appeals. The Third
Circuit rejected defendant’s claim of field preemption, holding
that federal preemption of the field of aviation safety standards,
as previously recognized by the Third Circuit in Abdullah v.
114 No. 01-14-00207-CV, 2015 WL 5076299, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 27, 2015, no pet.).
115 Id. at *1–3, *11.
116 Id. at *8.
117 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 2016).
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American Airlines,118 did not extend to state product liability
claims. It held:
Today, we clarify the scope of Abdullah and hold that neither the
Act nor the issuance of a type certificate per se preempts all air-
craft design and manufacturing claims. Rather, subject to tradi-
tional principles of conflict preemption, including in connection
with the specifications expressly set forth in a given type certifi-
cate, aircraft products liability cases like [a]ppellant’s may pro-
ceed using a state standard of care.119
In so doing, the court concluded that there was a presump-
tion against preemption in field preemption claims, and it re-
jected the conclusions of a letter submitted to the court by the
FAA that stated that the Federal Aviation Act “impliedly
preempts the field of aviation safety with respect to substantive
standards of safety.”120 It further stated that the preempted field
“extends broadly to all aspects of aviation safety and includes
product liability claims based on allegedly defective aircraft and
aircraft parts by preempting state standards of care.”121
In Estate of Becker v. Forward Technologies, Inc.,122 the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of product liability,
negligence, and warranty claims against a contractor who assem-
bled an allegedly defective carburetor float, finding that the
state law standards of care were preempted by the pervasive fed-
eral regulation of the design standards for aircraft fuel systems
under 14 C.F.R. parts 23, 25, and 33. The court further con-
cluded that plaintiff’s “general reference to ‘the Federal Avia-
tion Regulations’” did not provide a federal standard of care for
plaintiff’s state law claims.123 There was no dispute that plaintiff
could pursue manufacturing defect claims against the engine
manufacturer for the carburetor and the parts manufacturer ap-
proval (PMA) holder that built the carburetor and its compo-
nent parts. But “a hypothetical state remedy based on an
unsupported federal standard of care” did not warrant a trial as
118 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
119 Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 683.
120 Brief for the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration as Amici Curiae Supporitng Appellees at 1, Sikkelee, 822 F.3d 680
(No. 14-4193).
121 Id. at 2.
122 365 P.3d 1273 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); see 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.1, 25.1, 33.1
(2016).
123 Becker, 365 P.3d at 1281.
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to the contractor.124 In August 2016, the Washington Supreme
Court granted review.125
In Ahmadi v. United Continental Holdings, Inc.,126 plaintiff was
injured on a United Airlines flight when a fellow passenger
dropped luggage on plaintiff’s head while attempting to place it
in the overhead bin. Plaintiff brought suit in state court, alleging
negligence, res ipsa loquitur, negligence per se based on Califor-
nia Civil Code § 2100, breach of contract, and breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. United removed the
action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The
court found that plaintiff’s claims were subject to field preemp-
tion under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gilstrap v. United Air-
lines.127 The court examined each of plaintiff’s allegations of
negligence and, in each case, found that a pervasive federal reg-
ulation preempted the field at issue. These included the physi-
cal integrity of the overhead bins, flight attendant assistance,
failure to warn, and failure to train. The court rejected plain-
tiff’s res ipsa loquitur claim because plaintiff could not show that
United had exclusive control over the luggage itself. The court
also rejected plaintiff’s claim based on California Civil Code
§ 2100, which provided a higher standard of care for common
carriers. Since the court had found that the areas of aviation
safety at issue in the case were preempted by pervasive federal
regulations, the state statute could not be used to invoke negli-
gence per se. Accordingly, the court granted defendant’s mo-
tion for summary judgment.128 Likewise, in Spadoni v. United
Airlines, Inc.,129 the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the dismis-
sal of a delayed baggage claim based on an alleged violation of
the covenant of good faith, holding that the claim was pre-
empted by the ADA.130
In Blackwell v. Panhandle Helicopter Inc.,131 plaintiff brought
negligence claims against the owner-operator of a helicopter en-
gaged in harvesting Christmas trees. Plaintiff became entangled
in a rope used to bundle the trees for transport. He alleged he
124 Id. at 1275–81.
125 Estate of Becker v. Forward Techs., Inc., 377 P.3d 763 (Wash. 2016).
126 No. 1:14-cv-00264 LJO JLT, 2015 WL 4730116, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10,
2015).
127 709 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2013).
128 Ahmadi, 2015 WL 4730116, at *3, *7–9.
129 47 N.E.3d 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
130 Id. at 1153–54.
131 94 F. Supp. 3d 1205 (D. Or. 2015).
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was flipped when the helicopter operator lifted the bundle of
Christmas trees. Plaintiff alleged claims under common law neg-
ligence, regulations promulgated under Oregon’s Occupational
Safety and Health Division, and statutory negligence under Ore-
gon’s Employer Liability Law. Defendant moved to dismiss
plaintiff’s claims for common law negligence and under the Or-
egon Employer Liability Law to the extent the claims were based
on state law standards of care, claiming such contentions were
preempted by the Federal Aviation Act. Plaintiff conceded that
the standard of care for the preempted allegations would be de-
termined under federal law, and the court dismissed plaintiff’s
complaint to provide plaintiff the opportunity to revise his
claims to replead the proper standard of care.132
The court found that seven of plaintiff’s allegations of fault
were preempted because they embraced “areas of aviation safety
. . . pervasively regulated by the [Federal Aviation Act].”133 These
encompassed various alleged failures to follow defendant’s own
external load flight manual instructions for such operations and
operations of the helicopter in an unsafe manner or at an un-
safe speed. The court dismissed these allegations, granting leave
for plaintiff “to amend his negligence claim to allege violations
of the federal standard of care, if possible.”134 The court denied
dismissal for “[p]laintiff’s remaining allegations, [dealing] with
safety procedures governing helicopter pilots and ground work-
ers in tree harvesting.”135 These included allegations of failure
to follow defendant’s own safety management system manual in
a variety of respects. The court found that, “[u]nlike the allega-
tions dealing with the flight manual or safe helicopter speeds,
there [wa]s no evidence of a pervasive regulatory scheme that
demonstrate[d] Congress’s intent to preempt the field of avia-
tion safety implicated by safety procedures governing” coordina-
tion between “helicopter pilots and ground workers in tree
harvesting.”136
B. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT (FSIA)
In OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs,137 the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously reversed an en banc Ninth Circuit decision inter-
132 Id. at 1207–09.
133 Id. at 1211.
134 Id. at 1212.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1211–13.
137 136 S. Ct. 390 (2015).
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preting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Plaintiff,
a U.S. citizen, purchased a Eurail pass in the United States. She
was seriously injured in Austria while traveling on the pass, fall-
ing onto the tracks while attempting to board a train operated
by the Austrian state-owned railway, OBB Personenverkehr AG
(OBB). Her legs had to be amputated above the knee after
OBB’s moving train crushed them. She sued the railway in U.S.
district court based on her purchase of the pass in the United
States. Plaintiff obtained the Eurail pass over the Internet by
purchasing it from The Rail Pass Experts, a Massachusetts-based
travel agent. OBB moved to dismiss. Plaintiff argued that the
FSIA’s exception for commercial activity within the United
States permitted the action to proceed, given that Eurail’s agent
sold the ticket to plaintiff in the United States. The trial court
granted OBB’s motion to dismiss, and the Ninth Circuit initially
affirmed in a 2-1 decision. But the Ninth Circuit later reversed
in a 7-4 en banc decision.138
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the
FSIA did not permit common law principles of agency to impute
Rail Pass Experts’ sale in the United States to OBB. Rather, the
commercial activity exception to FSIA requires that “the action
is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state.”139 Such a determination “first re-
quires a court to ‘identify[ ] the particular conduct on which the
[plaintiff’s] action is based.’”140 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit
had justified jurisdiction on the fact that the sale of the pass
satisfied “one element” of each of her claims.141 This was errone-
ous because the Court’s prior holding was “flatly incompatible
with a one-element approach.”142 Rather, the Court had “zeroed
in on the core of their suit: the Saudi sovereign acts that actually
injured them.”143 Consequently, “the conduct constituting the
gravamen of Sachs’s suit plainly occurred abroad. All of her
claims turn on the same tragic episode in Austria, allegedly
caused by wrongful conduct and dangerous conditions in Aus-
138 Id. at 393–94; see Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 596, 603 n.9
(9th Cir. 2013) (listing many of the foreign state-owned airlines that as of 2008
were 51–100% government-owned); Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 695 F.3d 1021,
1029 (9th Cir. 2012).
139 OBB, 136 S. Ct. at 392–93 (alterations omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2)).
140 Id. at 395 (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356 (1993)).
141 Sachs, 737 F.3d at 599.
142 OBB, 136 S. Ct. at 396 (citing Nelson, 507 U.S. at 356).
143 Id.
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tria, which led to injuries suffered in Austria.”144 To hold other-
wise, the Court said, would “allow plaintiffs to evade the [FSIA]’s
restrictions through artful pleading.”145 The Court cited Justice
Holmes’s letter, stating that the “essentials” of a personal injury
action will be found at the “point of contact”—“the place where
the boy got his fingers pinched.”146 In this case, all such “essen-
tials” were in Austria.147
In Abdel-Karim v. EgyptAir Airlines,148 plaintiff flew from New
York to Cairo on an EgyptAir flight but was arrested upon his
arrival and charged with illegally bringing weapons into the
country. He was later acquitted. He brought suit against both
EgyptAir and its parent company, EgyptAir Holding Company
(EHC). EHC moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under the
FSIA. Plaintiff argued that EHC, an instrumentality of the Egypt
government, waived immunity to operate an airline in the
United States and engaged in commercial activity within the
United States by contracting with United Airlines. EHC’s subsid-
iary, EgyptAir, operated a commercial airline in the United
States and EHC employees were assigned to work for EgyptAir
in the United States during the events at issue. The court re-
jected these arguments and held that plaintiff’s waiver argument
was premised on the assumption that EgyptAir and EHC were
the same entity, but plaintiff had failed to show any basis for this
assertion.149
As for the commercial activities exception to FSIA, the court
found that although EHC had contracted with United Airlines,
the action was not based upon that contract. Likewise, although
EgyptAir operated a commercial airline in the United States,
plaintiff failed to show that EHC and EgyptAir operated as a sin-
gle entity. Finally, although two EHC employees had been
tasked to work for EgyptAir at John F. Kennedy International
Airport (JFK), plaintiff failed to rebut the declaration of an EHC
vice president stating that when employees were assigned to
work for EgyptAir, EgyptAir determined their responsibilities
and paid their salaries. Therefore, the EHC employees were act-
ing as EgyptAir employees at the time. In addition, their actions
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 397.
147 Id. at 392–97.
148 116 F. Supp. 3d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
149 Id. at 394.
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were peripheral to the events at issue and did not form the basis
or a foundation for plaintiff’s claims.150
Thus, the only viable defendant in the case was EgyptAir.
Plaintiff asserted a variety of common law claims against
EgyptAir, but the court found these claims were preempted by
the ADA and granted summary judgment on all claims except
that premised on breach of contract. The court determined that
“all of the plaintiff’s claims relate[d] to EgyptAir’s actions and
procedures for handling and inspecting special items” in plain-
tiff’s checked baggage and, “more generally, [EgyptAir’s] bag-
gage handling procedures.”151 The court determined that such
claims were “indirectly” aimed at the airline’s procedures for
handling check luggage and, therefore, bore a direct relation-
ship to the airline’s services. Because such claims “would require
the defendants to adopt heightened and qualitatively different
procedures for baggage handling,” they were preempted by the
ADA.152
In Flanagan v. Islamic Republic of Iran,153 the court held that
relatives of the victim of a terrorist bombing of a U.S. ship in
Yemen were entitled to recover from Iranian and Sudanese de-
fendants, which were not entitled to immunity under FSIA. The
case arose out of the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole on October 12,
2000, in the Port of Aden. The court found that it could “assert
jurisdiction over the subject matter because money damages
[we]re sought for an extra-judicial killing . . . caused by the pro-
vision of material support or resources . . . to Bin Laden and Al-
Qaeda by the Sudanese and Iranian defendants, acting within
the scope of their official employment.”154 Personal jurisdiction
existed over the defendants, which were either foreign states or
subdivisions of foreign states. Plaintiffs effected service on the
Sudanese defendants through courier delivery of the summons,
complaints, and attachments to the Sudanese Minister of For-
eign Affairs in Khartoum, Sudan. They perfected service on the
Iranian defendants by submitting summons, complaints, and no-
tices to the Foreign Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzer-
land in Tehran for conveyance to the Iranian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The defendants did not appear, but the court
150 Id. at 396, 402–04.
151 Id. at 405.
152 Id. at 405–06 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153 87 F. Supp. 3d 93 (D.D.C. 2015).
154 Id. at 113.
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entered default judgment against all defendants based upon evi-
dence submitted.155
Aureus Asset Managers, Ltd. v. United States156 arose from the
hijacking of EgyptAir Flight 648 on November 23, 1985. It was
later determined that the terrorist attack was sponsored by the
government of Libya. The plaintiffs were an asset management
and insurance provider to EgyptAir who sought to recover for
the hull damage caused by the terrorists. After the United States
“lifted Libya’s sovereign immunity in 1996 for its state sponsor-
ship of terrorism,” plaintiffs filed claims for indemnification.157
However, in 2008, the United States “restored Libya’s sovereign
immunity . . . , thereby terminating all pending claims against
Libya, and directing the claims of U.S. nationals to be heard by
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission . . . , an indepen-
dent agency within the Department of Justice.”158 However, the
Commission lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because
they were not U.S. nationals.159
Plaintiffs sued the government, alleging a taking in violation
of the Fifth Amendment, and sought compensation in the
Claims Court under the Tucker Act.160 The U.S. government
moved to dismiss, but the court denied the motion. It noted that
determining whether government action constitutes a Fifth
Amendment taking requires the court to consider two ques-
tions: (1) “whether the claimant has identified a cognizable
Fifth Amendment property interest that [was] the subject of the
taking”; and (2) if so, “whether that property interest was
‘taken.’”161 The question in this case was whether a cause of ac-
tion constituted a legally recognized property interest protected
by the Fifth Amendment. The court rejected the government’s
argument that plaintiffs did not have such an interest because
they did not own the aircraft hull and were not attempting to
enforce the insurance contracts against Libya. The court con-
cluded that plaintiffs’ causes of action were property rights
when they protected legally recognized property interests. The
suit for damages “was filed to protect [p]laintiffs from losses sus-
155 Id. at 114, 116.
156 121 Fed. Cl. 206 (2015).
157 Id. at 207.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 207–08.
160 Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
161 Aureus Asset Managers, 121 Fed. Cl. at 210.
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tained under their insurance contracts.”162 They did not have to
own the aircraft or enforce the insurance contract to protect
those interests. The court also found that plaintiffs had pleaded
a plausible takings claim, for the taking occurred “when the
[g]overnment terminated their legal claims and then failed to
provide an alternate means of recovery.”163 The court deemed
this sufficient to establish a claim.164
In Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,165 plaintiffs brought
suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran, “seek[ing] recovery for
imprisonment, torture, and extra-judicial killing they allegedly
suffered at the hands of the Islamic Republic.”166 Plaintiffs
claimed that Iran was subject to jurisdiction under the terrorism
exception to the FSIA. However, the district court dismissed and
the court of appeals affirmed. The FSIA requires not only that
the foreign country was designated a state sponsor of terrorism
at the time of the FSIA, but also that the claimant or victim was a
“national of the United States” at that time. In this case, the acts
of terrorism were alleged to have occurred between 1999 and
2006 when not one of the plaintiffs was a citizen of the United
States. They alleged “that they qualified as [U.S.] nationals dur-
ing that time because they ‘owe[d] permanent allegiance to the
United States’” and had disclaimed their loyalty to Iran follow-
ing the first signs of persecution in Iran.167 One plaintiff also
alleged she had exhibited her allegiance by applying for and ob-
taining U.S. permanent residence status before her brother’s
death. However, manifestations of permanent allegiance by
themselves were held legally insufficient to render a person a
U.S. national. The court held that non-citizens of the United
States can be considered “nationals” only under the provisions
of 8 U.S.C. § 1408, which lists four categories of such persons,
generally consisting of those “born in, or possessing a specified
personal or parental connection with, an ‘outlying possession of
the United States’” (i.e., American Samoa and Swains Island).168
Because the FSIA affords the “sole basis” for obtaining jurisdic-
162 Id. at 212 (emphasis in original).
163 Id. at 214.
164 Id. at 209–10, 213.
165 782 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
166 Id. at 12.
167 Id. at 14.
168 Id. at 14–15.
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tion over a foreign state in the United States, plaintiffs’ failure to
satisfy the terrorism exception to the FSIA required dismissal.169
C. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT (ADA)
In National Federation of the Blind v. United Airlines Inc.,170 plain-
tiffs sought a class action on behalf of blind travelers to chal-
lenge United’s policy of using automatic kiosks for accessing
flight information, checking in for flights, printing boarding
passes, checking baggage, and selecting and upgrading seats.
The kiosks “require[d] user responses to visual prompts on a
computer touchscreen,” making the kiosks inaccessible to blind
people.171 Plaintiffs claimed that United’s refusal to accommo-
date blind travelers violated California’s anti-discrimination
laws. United moved to dismiss, contending that plaintiffs’ claims
were expressly preempted by the ADA and impliedly preempted
by the ACAA. The Ninth Circuit held that the claims were not
preempted by the ADA because under a prior Ninth Circuit de-
cision, “Congress did not intend ‘service’ to refer to the ‘assis-
tance to passengers in need, or like functions.’ While they may
be convenient for passengers, kiosks are not ‘services’ in the
‘public utility sense.’”172 The court rejected United’s argument
that Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. was no longer good law in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Rowe
v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n173 and subsequent deci-
sions of other lower courts, interpreting Rowe to require a
broader definition of “services” than that stated in Charas.174
The Ninth Circuit concluded that neither Rowe nor the Court’s
more recent decision in Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg175 was “clearly
inconsistent” with Charas.176
The court nevertheless affirmed the dismissal, based on the
preemptive effect of a federal regulation promulgated pursuant
169 Id. at 13–16.
170 813 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2016).
171 Id. at 723.
172 Id. at 726 (citations omitted) (quoting Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
160 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
173 Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
174 Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 813 F.3d at 727 (citing Rowe, 522 U.S. 364); see, e.g.,
Bower v. Egyptair Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 2013); DiFiore v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 88 n.9 (1st Cir. 2011); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v.
Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 2008).
175 Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014).
176 Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 813 F.3d at 727 (citing Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at
1433–34).
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to the ACAA by the Department of Transportation (DOT) after
oral argument in the case. The new regulation pervasively regu-
lated the accessibility of airport kiosks and “inform[ed] airlines
with striking precision about the attributes their accessible ki-
osks must have. In doing so, the new regulation speaks directly
to the concerns raised by the [National Federation of the
Blind]’s suit.”177 The regulation was “unmistakably pervasive in
the pertinent sense, in that it exhaustively regulates the relevant
attributes of accessible kiosks.”178 Furthermore, the “phase-in”
time prescribed in the new regulation was closely analogous to
phased-in automobile airbag regulation, which the Supreme
Court held to preempt state law in Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co.179
In Xiaoyun Lu v. AirTran Airways, Inc.,180 the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed dismissal of a passenger’s complaint based on ADA pre-
emption. Plaintiff claimed that she was injured when some fluid
leaked from an air vent above her seat, that airline personnel
treated her rudely, and that she subsequently endured a verbal
altercation with two flight attendants who accused her of refus-
ing to turn off her phone prior to departure, which caused her
to be escorted off the plane by security personnel. The court
held that plaintiff’s claim of the airline personnel’s alleged
rudeness while executing boarding procedure was preempted
by the ADA, as was her claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing based on the same underlying
facts. The court found that her claim that the airline wrongfully
removed her from the plane was “too attenuated” from trans-
portation itself or “services” to support preemption under the
ADA, but th court nevertheless affirmed dismissal because 49
U.S.C. § 44902(b) “absolves air carriers of liability for refusal to
transport to a passenger if ‘the carrier decides [the passenger]
is, or might be, inimical to safety.’”181
In Overka v. American Airlines, Inc.,182 the skycaps at Boston’s
Logan Airport sued the airline for alleged violations of state law
after the airline imposed a two dollar per bag curb-side check-in
177 Id. at 735.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 723, 736–37 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 885
(2000)).
180 631 F. App’x 657 (11th Cir. 2015).
181 Id. at 659–61 (quoting Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 12 (1st
Cir. 2008)).
182 790 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2015).
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fee. They claimed that the airline “failed to adequately notify
customers that skycaps would not receive the proceeds from the
new charge” and “that [the skycaps’] compensation ‘decreased
dramatically’ following the introduction of the new charge” be-
cause “fewer passengers tipped skycaps on top of paying the per-
bag charge.”183 The skycaps alleged that the surcharge violated
the Massachusetts tips law and constituted “tortious interference
with the ‘implied contractual [and] advantageous relationship
. . . between skycaps and [American’s] customers,’” unjust en-
richment, and quantum meruit.184 The trial court dismissed
plaintiffs’ claims, and the First Circuit affirmed. The First Circuit
cited prior precedent that “conclusively” resolved the question
whether baggage handling fees related to a price, route, or ser-
vice of an air carrier within the meaning of the ADA preemption
clause and noted that the sole exception concerned breach of
contract claims asserted against an airline under Wolens.185
The court concluded that plaintiffs’ arguments with respect to
common law unjust enrichment and tortious interference
claims were foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sion in Ginsberg, which held that a claim of breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was preempted. The
court, therefore, upheld the district court’s dismissal of the
claims.186 However, in Valencia v. SCIS Air Security Corp.,187 the
California Court of Appeal held that a company that performed
security checks on catering equipment for airlines was subject to
state labor and unfair competition laws requiring meal and rest
breaks, therefore the ADA did not preempt such claims.188
By contrast, in Grupp v. DHL Express (USA) Inc.,189 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal held that the ADA preempted plaintiffs’
claims that DHL violated the False Claims Act by imposing a jet
fuel surcharge for deliveries even when made by ground trans-
portation, thereby fraudulently representing routes and ex-
penses. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for
DHL. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Califor-
183 Id. at 37.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 37–38 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228–33
(1995)).
186 Id. at 39–40 (citing Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1426
(2014)).
187 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
188 Id. at 776.
189 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
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nia Supreme Court remanded the case with directions to recon-
sider in light of another recent preemption decision under
California’s Unfair Competition Law.190 On remand, the Court
of Appeal again upheld the dismissal, finding that the claims
were preempted. The court noted that Supreme Court prece-
dent established that when the statute preempts claims relating
to rates, routes, or services, it preempts state law claims even if
the law is not specifically designed to affect such claims, even
when the law is one of general applicability.191
The court acknowledged that the ADA did not apply to con-
tract claims. However, it rejected the contention that the claims
were too tenuous for preemption. To uphold the claims would
“cause DHL to alter prices, routes[,] and services, i.e., it could
no longer impose challenged surcharges and use ground routes
for air packages. This direct impact would be significant, which
is unacceptable.”192 Furthermore, the court concluded that the
People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. decision did
not compel a different result. The claim in Pac Anchor made no
reference to the prices, routes, or services of the defendant
trucking companies, nor did it refer to the transportation of
property. It simply alleged unfair competition “for misclassifying
drivers as independent contractors and for other alleged viola-
tions of California’s labor and unemployment insurance
laws.”193 The court also rejected Relator’s argument that the
case was “akin to an action on a contract.”194 The court noted
that contract claims were not preempted under Wolens because
such obligations are self-imposed. The purpose of preemption is
to “prevent a plaintiff from obtaining something other than the
benefit of its contractual bargain.”195 DHL did not specifically
agree to be liable for treble damages or statutory penalties nor
to be subject to claims by qui tam plaintiffs. Due to the boiler-
plate agreement’s confinement to performance of services, the
court found it “[could not] be read to extend to the submission
of claims.”196 Therefore, claims based on laws external to DHL’s
190 Id. at 541 (citing People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc., 329 P.3d
180, 183 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied sub nom., PAC Anchor Transp., Inc. v. Cal. ex rel.
Harris, 135 S. Ct. 1400 (2015)).
191 Id. at 541–43 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
384 (1992)).
192 Id. at 545.
193 Pac Anchor, 329 P.3d at 183.
194 Grupp, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 549.
195 Id.
196 Id.
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agreement to provide delivery services were outside the scope of
the contract and therefore preempted.197
In Gleason v. United Airlines, Inc.,198 the court held that the
ADA preempted state law claims filed by a passenger with an
alleged peanut allergy. Upon boarding, plaintiff told the crew of
her condition and asked them to make an announcement. The
crew did not make the announcement, and the plaintiff later
began to experience symptoms of a severe peanut allergy attack
and noticed a passenger four rows behind her eating peanuts.
Although she took an antihistamine and used her inhaler, her
condition worsened to the degree that the flight had to make an
emergency landing, and she went into intensive care for two
days. However, the court concluded that the claim related to a
“price, route, or service of an air carrier” and that each of plain-
tiff’s claims was based on a service the air carrier failed to pro-
vide.199 Therefore, the court concluded that the ADA
preempted the claim.200
In David v. United Continental Holdings, Inc.,201 plaintiff
brought claims on his own behalf, and potential class action
claims, alleging that United employed deceptive trade practices
in the way it marketed paid DirecTV and Wi-Fi services on the
flight. He claimed that the airline “advertised to passengers via
the TV screen to ‘SWIPE NOW’ to receive over 100 channels of
DirecTV.”202 Moreover, according to plaintiff, “[a]t no time
before or during the process of purchasing DirecTV service was
[p]laintiff informed that the DirecTV service [p]laintiff pur-
chased” would work for only about ten minutes of his four-hour
flight from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Newark, New Jersey, be-
cause the aircraft flew over the ocean.203 United elsewhere dis-
closed that its Wi-Fi and satellite service was limited to the
continental United States but did not disclose this to passengers
aboard the aircraft. The court granted United’s motion to dis-
197 Id. at 544–50.
198 No. 2:13-cv-01064-MCE-DAD, 2015 WL 2448682, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 19,
2015).
199 Id. at *2.
200 Id. at *1–2.
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miss holding that Wi-Fi and DirecTV were services, so the claims
were preempted under the ADA.204
D. AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT (ACAA)
In Segalman v. Southwest Airlines Co.,205 plaintiff, a disabled air-
line passenger, appealed the dismissal of his claims against the
airline under the Americans with Disabilities Act and California
statutes prohibiting disability discrimination, as well as a state
law negligence claim. Plaintiff alleged that Southwest improp-
erly handled his electronic wheelchair. Plaintiff had conceded
that the Americans with Disabilities Act did not apply to airport
terminals as a “place of public accommodation” governed by the
statute.206 The district court also had found plaintiff’s claims
under California law and common law negligence to be pre-
empted by the federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA).207 While the case was pending,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gilstrap determined that the
ACAA regulations preempted any applicable state standard of
care, but state remedies were available if and when airlines vio-
late the federal standards.208 The Ninth Circuit remanded the
case for the district court to determine whether California law
provided remedies for any alleged violations of federal
regulations.209
VI. AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
(ATSA)
Baez v. JetBlue Airways Corp.210 addressed the scope of immu-
nity conferred on airline personnel under the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA). ATSA, passed in the imme-
diate aftermath of September 11, 2001, requires air carrier em-
ployees to report any suspicious activity, including “any
suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or
regulation, relating to air piracy, a threat to aircraft or passenger
safety, or terrorism” to law enforcement personnel, and it en-
204 Id. at *1–3; see also Crown v. PHI Air Med., L.L.C., No. 15-cv-10180, 2015 WL
3409010, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2015) (removal based on ADA preemption
rejected).
205 603 F. App’x 595 (9th Cir. 2015).
206 Id. at 596.
207 Id.
208 Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2013).
209 Id. at 1008.
210 793 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 2015).
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sures that anyone who does make such a report “shall not be
civilly liable to any person under any law or regulation of the
United States, any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or
political subdivision of any State, for such disclosure.”211 In ef-
fect, it preempts state law liability whenever it applies.
Plaintiff had checked in several hours before departure but
did not arrive at her departure gate at JFK until just after the
airplane door had closed, and she was refused boarding. She
asked about the status of her checked bag. Airline personnel
told her she could reclaim it when she reached her destination
on a later flight. She made a cryptic reference to the possibility
of a bomb in her luggage. JetBlue’s gate agent reported the inci-
dent to a supervisor. As a result of the report, plaintiff was de-
tained, questioned, and charged with making a false bomb
threat. The flight was rerouted and plaintiff’s bag was inspected
upon landing. No bomb was found, but security personnel did
find marijuana residue. Ultimately, the bomb charge was
dropped, but plaintiff pleaded guilty to misdemeanor drug
charges. She sued the airline, alleging a variety of state law
claims, including defamation, false arrest, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and claiming that the gate agent had
misrepresented her statements. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment to JetBlue. On appeal, the court acknowledged
the differences between various versions of events, but even con-
struing them in the plaintiff’s favor, a hypothetical question
about the security risk posed by a checked bag unaccompanied
by its owner, which might contain a bomb, would cause a rea-
sonable law enforcement officer to investigate. And once the se-
curity agents followed up, the decision was theirs based upon
their evaluation of the evidence at hand. The airline might have
been in violation of the ATSA had it not reported the incident.
Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed.212
VII. MONTREAL CONVENTION
A. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
In Cattaneo v. American Airlines, Inc.,213 plaintiff, an elderly wo-
man, was injured during a flight when a cup of boiling water
spilled on her lap. She was on a domestic leg of a trip from Los
Angeles to Cozumel, Mexico. She filed suit in California state
211 Id. at 274 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 44941(a) (2001)).
212 Id. at 272–75, 277.
213 No. 15-cv-01748-BLF, 2015 WL 5610017, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015).
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court approximately two-and-a-half years after the incident
(within California’s statute of limitations). American removed
the action to federal court and moved to dismiss based on the
Montreal Convention’s two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff
argued that state law governed because the injury occurred on a
purely domestic leg of the flight, but the court disagreed. It held
that, under prior Ninth Circuit precedent, the Montreal Con-
vention governs when the domestic flight is part of an agree-
ment for international carriage. Accordingly, the claim was time-
barred.214
In D’engle v. City of New York,215 plaintiff sued American Air-
lines and other defendants under state law for negligence and,
alternatively, under the Montreal Convention. American moved
to dismiss based on the Montreal Convention’s two-year statute
of repose and, alternatively, based on preemption by the ADA.
The court granted American’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff was a
passenger on an American flight from Brussels to Kingston, Ja-
maica. His itinerary was comprised of three legs: Brussels to New
York, New York to Miami, then Miami to Jamaica. Plaintiff was a
martial artist who intended to travel with both his nunchaku and
his folding knife. He had reviewed the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) prohibited items list before traveling and
learned that both items could be placed in checked baggage.
Before boarding in Brussels, he asked a ticketing agent whether
this non-carry-on baggage would be checked straight through to
Jamaica and was told, erroneously, that it would.216
However, upon arrival at JFK, the checked baggage was re-
turned to him, and he was told to recheck the baggage before
boarding his next flight. However, before rechecking the bag-
gage, he had to proceed through a security check point, where a
security guard inquired about the contents of the baggage. He
disclosed the items and was told they would be confiscated.
Before he was able to board the flight, he was arrested by two
Port Authority officers and charged with possession of the
nunchaku because possession of such an item is illegal in New
York. While in custody he allegedly was the victim of physical
abuse and claimed violations of his civil rights. He was later
taken into court, pleaded guilty to a violation, and paid a small
fine. His claim against American was based upon the misinfor-
214 Id. at *2–3.
215 No. 14 Civ. 8236(GBD), 2015 WL 4476477, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2015).
216 Id. at *1–5.
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mation given before boarding in Brussels and the arrest at JFK.
He alleged that he would not have packed the nunchaku in his
baggage had he known it would be returned to him at some
point during the trip. The court held that both claims were
barred under the Montreal Convention. The Montreal Conven-
tion applied because both events took place in the course of an
international flight, either on the airplane or while embarking
or disembarking. He failed to file within the two-year time pe-
riod prescribed under the Montreal Convention. Plaintiff
claimed that the statute should be tolled because he had filed a
proof of claim in the Bankruptcy Court against American in the
interim. However, the court concluded that equitable tolling did
not apply to the Montreal Convention’s statute of repose. Alter-
natively, the court held that the state tort negligence claim was
barred under the ADA because the activity in Brussels related to
a service and the agent’s errors could be categorized, at best, as
providing improper service.217
B. DEFENDANTS SUBJECT TO MONTREAL CONVENTION
Baillie v. Medaire Inc.218 arose from a medical emergency dur-
ing a British Airways flight from London to Phoenix, Arizona,
when a passenger experienced what turned out to be a major
heart attack. The airline had contracted with Medaire to provide
medical advice in the event of in-flight medical emergencies.
Plaintiff, as representative of the estate of the deceased passen-
ger, claimed that Medaire’s physicians, who were consulted by
radio from the aircraft, gave erroneous and inconsistent advice,
which caused the airline to continue on to Phoenix rather than
make an emergency landing earlier. Plaintiff sued Medaire and
the physicians who had given advice. The court agreed with
plaintiff that the Montreal Convention applied to medical prov-
iders who provide services made “‘in furtherance of the contract
of carriage of an international flight.’”219 Here, Medaire’s con-
tract with the airline brought its services within the ambit of the
Montreal Convention. The court also rejected defendants’ argu-
ments that they were immunized from liability by reason of the
Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998 because that statute,
akin to a “Good Samaritan” law, immunized medical providers
217 Id. at *8–15.
218 No. CV-14-00420-PHX-SMM, 2015 WL 8139397, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 8,
2015).
219 Id. at *2 (quoting McGasky v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 580
(S.D. Tex. 2001)).
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who acted as volunteers, not those who provided services for a
fee and were not even aboard the airplane. The court denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss.220
C. VENUE
In Avalon Technologies, Inc. v. Emo-Trans, Inc.,221 plaintiff
brought a breach of contract claim arising from a contract to
ship $7.5 million in computer equipment from the United
States to a company in Ireland. The entire shipment was dam-
aged in transit and the company in Ireland refused to accept the
shipment, causing the equipment manufacturer to hold the dis-
tributor liable for payment. The distributor sued the freight for-
warder and the air carrier in Michigan. Defendant Emo moved
to transfer, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), because the invoice
specifically invoked New York law and set forth an agreement to
jurisdiction and venue in the federal and state courts of New
York or Nassau county. Emo argued that under a recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision, a forum selection clause should be up-
held absent a strong showing that it should be set aside and
should be ordinarily given controlling weight.222 However, plain-
tiff argued, and the court agreed, that Article 33 of the Montreal
Convention confirmed jurisdiction on the courts of the nation-
state rather than a particular court within that nation-state.
Plaintiff further argued that the forum selection clause alters
the rule regarding jurisdiction under the Montreal Convention
by limiting plaintiff to filing suit in the United States, whereas
the Montreal Convention would give plaintiff the option of fil-
ing suit in the United States, Canada, or Ireland. Thus, plaintiff
argued, the forum selection clause should be deemed null and
void according to Article 49 of the Montreal Convention. The
court noted that under the Montreal Convention, “an action for
damages ‘must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff,’ in a State-
Party as long as that nation has one of the enumerated connec-
tions to the parties.”223 The forum selection clause demonstrably
altered Article 33’s jurisdictional prescription by seemingly re-
quiring plaintiff to file suit in the United States, specifically in
the state of New York. Because the forum selection clause al-
tered and restricted plaintiff’s option, it was deemed void under
220 Id. at *1–3.
221 No. 14-14731, 2015 WL 3400619, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2015).
222 See Atlantic Marine Construction Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 134 S. Ct. 568
(2013).
223 Avalon Techs., 2015 WL 3400619, at *6 (emphasis in original).
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Articles 33 and 49. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to
transfer.224
D. BODILY INJURY
In Doe v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C.,225 plaintiff was en route from
Abu Dhabi to Chicago when she reached into the seat back
pocket and her finger was stuck by a hypodermic syringe. The
following day, she went to the doctor, who prescribed anti-viral
drugs for thirty days. She was tested for human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) three times in the following year, and
the tests ultimately determined that she had not developed HIV.
She sued for emotional distress, particularly from the fear of de-
veloping HIV or hepatitis. Plaintiff conceded that her mental
distress was not caused by her physical injury but by the possibil-
ity she may have been exposed to an infectious disease. The air-
line moved to dismiss and the court granted the motion. It held
that her emotional distress claim was not recoverable under the
Montreal Convention because it did not arise from a bodily
injury.226
E. DELAY
In Lee v. AMR Corp.,227 plaintiff, a passenger on an interna-
tional flight, sued American Airlines in state court. She had pur-
chased a multi-legged trip including stops from Miami to Belize.
However, when she attempted to obtain a boarding pass, the
ticket agent denied her request on the mistaken belief that she
did not have a proper Visa, and a second agent came to the
same conclusion. As a result, she had to change her flight’s des-
tination to Guatemala and incurred over $5,000 in expenses.
Defendant removed the case to federal court on federal ques-
tion grounds, claiming the Montreal Convention governed the
case entirely. The court denied plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.
Plaintiff argued that the Montreal Convention was inapplicable
because, due to the airline’s erroneous information, “she was
not allowed to board. She was never transported, carried[,] or
moved in any way by the [d]efendant or [its] agents.”228 There-
fore, she had never been provided any “carriage” within the nor-
224 Id. at *5–7 (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 206, arts. 33, 49).
225 No. 13-14358, 2015 WL 5936326, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 13, 2015).
226 Id. at *1–4.
227 No. 15-2666, 2015 WL 3797330, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2015).
228 Id. at *3.
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mal meaning of the word but was denied entrance without basis.
However, the court rejected her argument, noting that under
Article 19 of the Montreal Convention, the carrier will be held
liable for damages caused by delay in the carriage via air of pas-
sengers, baggage, or cargo. Furthermore, the term “interna-
tional air carriage” has been deemed to extend beyond actual
travel and includes claims in which a passenger is not permitted
to board.229
In Smith v. American Airlines, Inc.,230 plaintiff brought two
claims under the Montreal Convention for delay and a third
count for breach of contract. There was no dispute about the
adequacy of the contract claim, but the court dismissed plain-
tiff’s claims for passenger delay. The airline refused to check
plaintiff in because an airline employee said that the ticket did
not contain the complete flight itinerary. As a result, plaintiff
had to procure alternative flight arrangements at additional ex-
pense. The court held that the claim for damages based on the
airline’s refusal to permit plaintiff to board the flight consti-
tuted nonperformance, rather than delay, and therefore did not
state a claim. Absent a valid claim, the contract claim had to
satisfy the requirements for diversity jurisdiction, but it could
not do so because the amount in controversy was well below
$75,000. Accordingly, the court dismissed the contract claim for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.231
F. ACCIDENT
In Naqvi v. Turkish Airlines, Inc.,232 plaintiff brought a pro se
discrimination claim in D.C. Superior Court. Turkish Airlines
removed the action and moved to dismiss. The court held that
the Montreal Convention preempts federal discrimination
claims, so the plaintiff could only seek redress under Article 17.
Plaintiff also had alleged a breach of contract claim, and the
court held that contract claims that mirrored plaintiff’s tortious
theories of harm were also preempted by the Montreal Conven-
tion. Having determined that the Montreal Convention gov-
erned the claim, the court then analyzed plaintiff’s allegations
and concluded that he failed to state a compensable claim
229 Id. at *1–5.
230 No. 2:15-CV-14313-ROSENBERG/LYNCH, 2015 WL 6550723, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 29, 2015).
231 Id. at *1–3.
232 80 F. Supp. 3d 234 (D.D.C. 2015).
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under Article 17 by failing to establish an “accident” or actiona-
ble bodily injury. Plaintiff claimed that the airline’s failure to
assign him a seat of his choice brought extreme emotional and
physical distress that caused him “appetite loss and general mal-
aise.”233 This “anxiety” was compounded by defendant’s failure
to follow certain safety protocols. However, the court held Arti-
cle 17 precludes recovery for stand-alone mental injuries that do
not directly result from the passenger’s physical injury and also
precludes compensation for physical manifestations of mental
injuries. The court concluded that the “indignity, humiliation,
and extreme stress”234 plaintiff alleged may have adversely af-
fected his flight experience but were not compensable harms
under Article 17.235
In Nguyen v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.,236 an elderly, disabled
Vietnamese passenger brought an injury claim when she fell
down an escalator after deplaning in Dallas. She brought suit
under the Warsaw Convention, predecessor to the Montreal
Convention, alleging that the airline’s failure to place her in the
wheelchair she requested when booking her flight constituted
an accident under Article 17. She relied primarily on the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Olympic Airways v. Husain,237 which
held that a flight attendant’s repeated refusals to assist a passen-
ger (who had requested help three times) constituted an acci-
dent. Plaintiff also relied on the district court reasoning in
Husain, as well as Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc.238 But the
Fifth Circuit distinguished Husain and its progeny. In this case,
the airline made arrangements to have a wheelchair available. It
was not used because none of the airline employees could com-
municate with Ms. Nguyen, who spoke and understood only
Vietnamese. For a flight traveling from Seoul to Dallas, the air-
line’s failure to have a Vietnamese interpreter was consistent
233 Id. at 241.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 236, 240–41; see also Safa v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft,
Inc., 621 F. App’x 82, 83 (2d Cir. 2015) (a brief, unreported decision affirming
summary judgment because the airline’s response to an inflight medical emer-
gency did not constitute an “accident” under the Montreal Convention).
236 807 F.3d 133 (5th Cir. 2015).
237 540 U.S. 644, 647–48 (2004).
238 Nguyen, 807 F.3d at 138 (citing Blansett v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 379 F.3d
177, 179 (5th Cir. 2004); Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1134
(N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d sub nom., Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (“When a passenger boards
an airplane, he or she should be able to expect that the flight crew will comply
with accepted procedures and rules. A failure to do so is unexpected.”)).
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with accepted procedures and rules and did not constitute an
accident within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention.239
In Plonka v. U.S. Airways,240 plaintiff was injured during takeoff
when his leg struck an inflight entertainment (IFE) box bolted
on the floor near his feet. The court held that the injury was not
an accident under the Montreal Convention. The box was in-
stalled in compliance with an FAA-approved design. The “box in
front of [p]laintiff’s seat was not defective or altered in any
way.”241 The court concluded that plaintiff’s injury “was not an
‘unexpected or unusual event or happening’” because the box
was part of the aircraft’s approved design, and just under ninety
other passengers were similarly seated.242 The court treated the
case as being akin to those in which an airline is not held liable
for injuries arising from the normal arrangement and operation
of aircraft seats. Citing Husain, the court held that it is the cause
of the injury, not the occurrence of the injury, which must sat-
isfy the definition of accident. Accordingly, the court granted
U.S. Airways’s motion to dismiss.243
G. CARGO
In Batteries “R” Us Co. v. Fega Express Corp.,244 plaintiff brought
a negligence claim for property damage for loss of cargo in state
court. Defendant removed and then moved to dismiss, contend-
ing that the claim was completely preempted by the Montreal
Convention. Defendant argued that the Montreal Convention
applied and “bar[red] any suit in negligence against it . . . be-
cause [p]laintiffs[’] goods were stolen ‘during the carriage by
air.’”245 Plaintiff argued that there was no evidence defendant
issued an air waybill, the contract to indicate that defendant
took possession, and thus “the theft did not necessarily occur
‘during the carriage by air.’”246 However, plaintiff’s complaint
clearly alleged that defendant had “accepted the shipment deliv-
ered to it” and “issued its paperwork transport to Brazil” when
239 Id. at 135–39.
240 No. 13–7560, 2015 WL 6467917, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2015).
241 Id. at *2.
242 Id.
243 Id. at *1–3 (citing Husain, 540 U.S. at 650).
244 No. 15-21507-Civ-COOKE/TORRES, 2015 WL 4549497, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July
27, 2015).
245 Id. at *3.
246 Id.
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the goods were stolen.247 Therefore, the court dismissed the
complaint.248
By contrast, in Han v. FedEx Express,249 plaintiff sued FedEx in
state court claiming property damage for a lost shipment of
iPhones. He sought to ship them from Chicago to Dubai. His
complaint alleged claims of negligence, negligent supervision,
and breach of contract. FedEx removed the action and plaintiff
moved to remand. FedEx claimed that the federal court had
original jurisdiction because the Montreal Convention governed
liability for international carriage of persons, baggage, or cargo.
However, the court disagreed with FedEx’s assertion that the
Montreal Convention “took effect the moment Han tendered
his shipment to FedEx for carriage,” for “the [Montreal] Con-
vention’s preemptive effect on local law extends no further than
the [Montreal] Convention’s own substantive scope,” which
does not encompass a passenger before embarking.250 Article 18
only imposes liability for damage sustained “during the carriage
by air.” The complaint did not allege a loss during carriage by
air, but rather that FedEx lost the package without sending it by
air. Plaintiff’s claim was therefore based on nonperformance
and fell outside the scope of the Montreal Convention. FedEx
failed to show that the loss occurred during transport and,
therefore, was found to have failed in its burden to establish that
federal jurisdiction existed. The court remanded the case.251
Yoly Farmers Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.252 arose from interna-
tional shipment of fresh vegetables from the Dominican Repub-
lic to New York. Plaintiff contended that seven shipments of its
fresh produce were mishandled and damaged due to negligence
during their carriage. Delta contended that the plaintiff had
failed to provide adequate notice within fourteen days as re-
quired by the Montreal Convention. The court dismissed some
of the claims and not others, requiring minimal notice that sim-
ply indicated that the cargo was damaged. It denied defendant’s
motion as to claims where such minimal notice had been given
247 Id.
248 Id. at *1–3.
249 No. 15-cv-01582, 2015 WL 5163424, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2015).
250 Id. at *2 (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S.
155, 171–72 (1999)).
251 Id. at *1–3.
252 No. 15 Civ. 2774(BMC), 2015 WL 4546744, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2015).
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and dismissed those claims where plaintiff failed to give any no-
tice of damage.253
H. OTHER
In Narkiewicz-Laine v. Aer Lingus Limited,254 plaintiff claimed he
was injured onboard his flight when a flight attendant struck
him in the head with a bag as she walked down the aisle. The
incident occurred on a flight from Helsinki to Dublin. He
claimed he was asleep when the incident occurred. Plaintiff be-
lieved he suffered a seizure and was taken by ambulance to a
hospital in Dublin for medical treatment and flew home two
days later. He complained of dizziness, vertigo, and headaches
to his primary care physician. According to plaintiff’s medical
records, he complained of being “hit in [the] head by [a] piece
of luggage [then] had a seizure.”255 However, he identified no
expert witnesses, whereas defendant retained an expert neurolo-
gist who submitted a report saying that, “to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty, [p]laintiff did not suffer a seizure . . . [or]
. . . aggravate a preexisting seizure condition” from the alleged
incident.256 The neurologist opined that plaintiff instead suf-
fered a panic attack, which was not related to any bodily injury.
Aer Lingus moved for summary judgment, but the court denied
the motion. It held that plaintiff would not be able to present
testimony regarding seizures because he failed to provide any
witness to establish that the incident caused a seizure. However,
his factual testimony established a prima facie case that the blow
to his head injured him and caused various physical manifesta-
tions “including vertigo, nausea, and loss of concentration, as
well as medical bills.”257
VIII. PRODUCT LIABILITY
A. PROOF OF DEFECT
In Lewis v. Lycoming,258 the court denied summary judgment
to Lycoming on a case arising from the crash of a Schweizer
269C helicopter, allegedly as a result of a defect in the design of
253 Id. at *1–3.
254 No. 14 CV 50098, 2015 WL 5009766, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2015).
255 Id. at *2.
256 Id. (emphasis in original).
257 Id. at *2; see also Lee v. AMR Corp., No. 15-2666, 2015 WL 3797330 (E.D. Pa.
June 18, 2015) (removal based on Montreal Convention).
258 No. 11-6475, 2015 WL 3444220, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2015).
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a fuel servo. Lycoming contended that there was no evidence
that the servo was defective in design and that plaintiffs had
failed to meet their burden of proof under either the consumer
expectations test or the risk utility test. The standard of proof
for defect in Pennsylvania has been clouded by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s recent decision, which jettisoned the prior
rule that had been in effect since 1978.259 No one knows what
Pennsylvania will do in lieu of the Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.
test. The court simply decided that summary judgment should
rarely be granted and denied the motion.260
In Schwartz v. Abex Corp.,261 the court attempted to predict
what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would do with respect to
the “bare metal defense” in asbestos cases. The court held that,
under Pennsylvania law, a manufacturer or supplier of a product
“is not liable in strict liability for aftermarket asbestos-containing
component parts that it neither manufactured nor supplied,
even if used in connection with that manufacturer’s (or sup-
plier’s) product.”262 However, a manufacturer or supplier could
be liable in negligence for failure to warn of the asbestos
hazards of such aftermarket component parts if it “(a) knew that
an asbestos-containing component part of that type would be
used with its product, and (b) knew at the time it placed its
product in the stream of commence that there were hazards as-
sociate with asbestos.”263 However, the court held that a product
manufacturer is not strictly liable for “asbestos-containing com-
ponent parts,” which it did not manufacture or supply, even if it
knew the component parts would be used with its product.264
In City of New York v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,265 the City of
New York purchased two Bell 412 air-sea rescue helicopters.
Slightly over a year later, while conducting a security patrol mis-
sion in one of the helicopters, the crew on board heard a loud
“bang” and then experienced a sudden loss of power. The crew
had to make an emergency landing in Jamaica Bay, which de-
stroyed the helicopter. Pratt & Whitney, the engine manufac-
259 Id. at *2–4 (citing Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 367, 376 (Pa.
2014); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1026–27 (Pa. 1978)).
260 Id. at *2–5.
261 106 F. Supp. 3d 626 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
262 Id. at 628.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 No. 13 CV 6848(RJD)(SMG), 2015 WL 3767241, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 16,
2015).
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turer, subsequently issued a recall notice for gearboxes installed
in certain engines, including the subject engine because of a
possible anomaly that causes both a fracture of the gear shaft
and a resulting loss of power. The National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the fracture of the gear
shaft caused the power loss in the subject engine. The court
granted Bell’s motion to dismiss, noting that Bell had made no
warranty of and disclaimed all liability for the Pratt engine and
disclaimed all other express and implied warranties, including
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Bell had
limited the City’s remedies to repair or replacement of the heli-
copter’s parts, specifically excluding any remedy for incidental
and consequential damages, defined broadly to include damage
to the helicopter. The court held that such a warranty was valid
as between the City and the manufacturer and that the City’s
requested damages were barred by the warranty’s limitations of
remedies.266
B. STATUTE OF REPOSE
In Linfoot v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.,267 plaintiffs, the
pilot and co-pilot of an AH-6M model helicopter, crashed dur-
ing a mission southwest of Baghdad; “the subject helicopter had
been ‘substantially rebuilt’ a number of times since it was manu-
factured and delivered to the Army in 1981 by [defendant’s]
predecessor, Hughes Helicopter.”268 Defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment based on the ten-year Tennessee statute of re-
pose. The court had to determine whether the issue was
governed by the law of Tennessee or Kentucky. Kentucky also
had a statute of repose, but one that only created a presumption
that the product was not defective if the injury occurred “more
than five . . . years after the date of sale to the first consumer or
more than eight . . . years after the date of manufacture.”269 The
helicopter had been based at Fort Campbell for more than
thirty years. Fort Campbell straddles the Kentucky and Tennes-
see border. The helicopter had been based at the Fort Campbell
airfield, on the Kentucky side, since at least September 1982.
Plaintiffs resided—and brought suit—in Tennessee.270
266 Id. at *1–3; see also Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 731 F. Supp. 2d
429, 432, 439 (M.D. Penn. 2010).
267 No. 3:09-cv-639, 2015 WL 1190171, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2015).
268 Id.
269 Id. at *2, *4.
270 Id. at *1, *3–4.
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Applying the Second Restatement of Conflicts, the court ulti-
mately decided that Kentucky law applied. The modifications to
the helicopter after sale occurred in Kentucky, and if negligent
maintenance of the helicopter or its parts occurred at all, the
evidence indicating such defect or negligence occurred in Ken-
tucky as well. The court rejected or refused to give predomi-
nance to plaintiffs’ residence or the inclusion of a Tennessee
statutory claim. Instead, the court concluded that the most sig-
nificant factor was that the relationship between the parties was
centered in Kentucky. Both plaintiffs’ regiment and the Fort
Campbell airfield were located on the Kentucky side of the base,
and the helicopter was delivered to Kentucky and based there
for more than thirty years. Furthermore, the court found no in-
congruity by applying Kentucky law to the claims of Tennessee
residents. The relevant Tennessee policy was “to limit the num-
ber of products liability actions and thereby reduce costs associ-
ated with litigation and product liability insurance.”271 The
rebuttable presumption under Kentucky law also limited such
actions and the related costs and was consistent with Tennes-
see’s policy. Furthermore, “Kentucky further[ed] an additional
policy effected through its product liability laws: protecting Ken-
tucky citizens and those injured within its boundaries.”272 Al-
though plaintiffs were Tennessee residents, the court deemed
this policy consideration relevant. Accordingly, the court denied
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.273
In SOCAR (Societe Cameroonaise d’Assurance et de Reassurance) v.
Boeing Co.,274 the court in New York rejected a hull subrogation
claim arising from an aircraft fire in the Republic of Cameroon
in 1984, choosing New York’s two shorter statutes of limitations
over Cameroon’s thirty-year statute of repose.275 And the Illinois
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment obtained by Boe-
ing in Hutton v. Boeing Co.276 based on Illinois’s product liability
statute of repose in an incident in which the pro se passenger-
plaintiff was struck by a ceiling filler panel on a twenty-one-year-
old Boeing 737-300.277
271 Id. at *6.
272 Id.
273 Id. at *5–6.
274 144 F. Supp. 3d 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
275 See id. at 396–98.
276 2015 IL App. (1st) 142697-U (Oct. 29, 2015).
277 See id., ¶¶ 9, 57, 59.
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IX. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA)
A. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
In United States v. Wong,278 a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) statute of limita-
tions was not “jurisdictional” and that claims against the federal
government could therefore be subject to “equitable tolling.”279
The statute provides that a claim “shall be forever barred” unless
the administrative claim is filed within two years, and the lawsuit
filed within six months of denial of the administrative claim.280
In two separate instances, plaintiffs failed to meet the deadlines
prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) but argued that the deadlines
should be equitably tolled. In one case, plaintiff claimed that the
government’s concealment of key information caused plaintiff
to miss the two-year deadline for filing the administrative claim;
in the other, plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to add an
FTCA claim, but the court failed to rule on the motion for leave
to amend until after the six-month deadline for filing had ex-
pired.281 A statute of limitations may be equitably tolled “when a
party ‘has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary
circumstance’ prevents him from meeting a deadline.”282 The
presumption that a statute containing a limited waiver of sover-
eign immunity may be equitably tolled can be rebutted, but the
rebuttal requires the government to show that Congress in-
tended to forbid equitable tolling, i.e., that it intended compli-
ance with the statute to be jurisdictional. In the case of the
FTCA, the Court concluded that nothing in the text, context, or
legislative history of the FTCA showed that Congress intended
the statute of limitations to be jurisdictional.283
Following the decision in Wong, a number of lower courts
have reconsidered prior decisions and given plaintiffs opportu-
nities to pursue equitable tolling arguments if the argument was
preserved.284 More recently, in Menominee Indian Tribe of Wiscon-
278 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2011)).
279 Id. at 1626.
280 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2011).
281 Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1627.
282 Id. at 1631 (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95
(1990)).
283 Id. at 1629–32.
284 See, e.g., Mark v. N. Navajo Med. Ctr., 631 F. App’x 514, 516–17 (10th Cir.
2015); Hawver v. United States, 808 F.3d 693, 694 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Domin-
guez v. United States, 799 F.3d 151, 154 (1st Cir. 2015) (equitable tolling argu-
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sin v. United States,285 the Supreme Court made clear that a liti-
gant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations
“only if the litigant establishes two elements: ‘(1) that he has
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordi-
nary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely fil-
ing.’”286 The Court reaffirmed that this test has two “‘elements,’
not merely factors of indeterminate or commensurable
weight.”287 The diligence prong “covers those affairs within the
litigant’s control; the extraordinary-circumstances prong, by
contrast, is meant to cover matters outside its control.”288 There-
fore, equitable tolling is allowed “only where the circumstances
that caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary and beyond
its control.”289
B. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
Turturro v. United States290 arose from the crash of a Grumman
AA-1C in which a student and instructor were performing touch-
and-goes at the Northeast Philadelphia Airport. Simultaneously,
an Agusta 139 helicopter was taking off on a training flight to
Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff contended that errors by the
United States as air traffic controllers and the Agusta pilots
caused the Grumman pilots to be “startled,” fearing that they
were facing a potential midair collision, and stalled the aircraft.
However, the district court granted summary judgment to both
defendants and the Third Circuit affirmed.291
The air traffic controller made a number of errors that the
court found were not relevant to the cause of the crash. The
court found that there was no reliable evidence that the Grum-
man pilots did have a startled reaction. As for the Agusta pilots,
the court rejected plaintiffs’ three contentions. First, they con-
tended that the Agusta pilots should not have requested a west-
erly takeoff that took them toward the flow of fixed-wing traffic.
But the court concluded that the Agusta pilots acted properly in
requesting such a takeoff given the wind direction. Further-
ment had been waived, but the court reached the same result based on the date-
of-discovery rule).
285 135 S. Ct. 750 (2016).
286 Id. at 755 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)).
287 Id. at 756 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
288 Id.
289 Id. (emphasis in original).
290 629 F. App’x 313 (3d Cir. 2015).
291 Id. at 321, 325.
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more, the court decided that the Airman’s Information Manual
instruction that helicopter pilots should “avoid the flow of fixed-
wing aircraft” did not apply to larger, faster helicopters where
the pilots are departing from a field with air traffic control ser-
vices.292 Second, plaintiffs argued that the Agusta pilots should
have clarified that they planned to go to the northwest when
they requested a departure in a westerly direction. However, the
crash occurred before they even had a chance to turn to the
north, so the purported ambiguity was immaterial. Third, plain-
tiffs contended that the Agusta pilots were negligent for failing
to respond to a direction from the air traffic controller to “make
right traffic.”293 The court rejected this argument because plain-
tiffs offered no evidence that a single missed call constituted a
lack of situational awareness; the mere failure to respond to one
callout, without more, could not amount to negligence. Nor did
the Agusta pilots’ “collective conduct” constitute negligence for
“bringing them too close to the Grumman.”294 There was no evi-
dence the two aircraft were ever closer than 1,000 feet, and the
two aircraft got only fifty feet closer to each other between the
time when the controller delivered the direction to make right
traffic and when the Grumman pilots lost control. Accordingly,
the Third Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment.295
C. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
In Vanderklok v. United States,296 plaintiff brought suit under
the FTCA, claiming a TSA baggage screener violated plaintiff’s
constitutional rights during an altercation at the Philadelphia
International Airport. The altercation began when the TSA
screener saw a heart monitoring watch and some Power Bars in
his carry-on bag and asked plaintiff to submit to additional
screening because he thought these items “looked like the com-
ponents of an explosive device.”297 The altercation led to plain-
tiff’s arrest. The court granted the government’s motion to
dismiss, however. The FTCA excludes most claims based on in-
tentional torts but carves out “acts or omissions of investigative
or law enforcement officers of the United States . . . .”298 The
292 Id. at 321–22.
293 Id. at 322.
294 Id. at 323.
295 Id. at 321–23, 325.
296 142 F. Supp. 3d 356 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
297 Id. at 358 (internal quotation marks omitted).
298 Id. at 360 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006)).
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court held, consistently with a number of other courts, that al-
though TSA screeners are federal employees, they are not “of-
ficers” of the United States. Therefore, the exception permitting
lawsuits based on the intentional misconduct of federal officers
did not apply and the claims were dismissed.299
D. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT (FECA)
In Krogen v. United States,300 plaintiff was working as an unpaid
U.S. Forest Service volunteer on a wildlife restoration project at
Sequoia National Park. He was engaged in an operation in
which he wore a vest attached to a hoist on a helicopter. The
connection broke, and he fell forty feet to the ground. Plaintiff
sued the United States. The government moved to dismiss be-
cause the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA)
preempts all other claims and remedies against the government.
Plaintiff argued that FECA was inapplicable because he was ex-
ternally sponsored. The court disagreed, finding FECA applica-
ble, but stayed the action in the event that the FTCA statute of
limitations ran and the Department of Labor later found that
FECA did not apply.301
X. CLASS ACTIONS
In Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,302 various air travelers
sued Delta for compensation on their own behalf and a nation-
wide class of persons inconvenienced “when their flights from
airports located in the European Union [(EU)] were delayed
for more than three hours or cancelled on short notice.”303
They filed suit under the Class Action Fairness Act. Their claim
was based on a consumer protection regulation promulgated by
the European Parliament, which set forth “standardized com-
pensation rates . . . for cancellations and long delays of flights”
from airports located in member states.304 Delta argued that the
regulation could not be enforced outside the EU. The district
court held that it could not enforce the regulation and dis-
missed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulation
requires each member state to designate a national administra-
299 Id. at 357–63.
300 No. 1:14-cv-1266-LJO-MJS, 2015 WL 5095836, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28,
2015).
301 Id. at *2, *5.
302 784 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2015).
303 Id. at 349–50.
304 Id. at 350.
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tive body to handle enforcement responsibilities. The regulation
did not have a forum limitation clause, but it did not clearly
empower courts in non-member countries to enforce it. Rather,
it appeared to contemplate that passenger claims would be han-
dled by administrative bodies and courts in member states. The
court concluded that asking the U.S. court to “wade into an area
of EU law that is fraught with uncertainty risks offending princi-
ples of international comity.”305 This is especially so where there
is no domestic analog to the remedy. Accordingly, the court up-
held the district court’s dismissal of the action.306
In Berkson v. Gogo LLC,307 Judge Weinstein gave preliminary
approval of a class action settlement of a claim based on the
purchase of Wi-Fi service connections on airline flights. Gogo
sold such service for ten dollars per day, or a monthly pass for
forty dollars. However, it allegedly did not notify customers of
continuing new charges if the customer failed to cancel the
service.308
The parties’ proposed settlement gave users who had pur-
chased monthly services “promo codes” that afforded limited
free use of Gogo’s service on future flights. The named plaintiffs
would receive up to $5,000 each, and plaintiff’s class counsel was
to receive up to $750,000. The court noted that “coupon class
settlements” were generally disfavored by Congress, other
courts, and commentators. The principal component of this
proposed settlement did “have the flavor and scent of cou-
pons.”309 Judge Weinstein “suggested” that the administrator of
the settlement attempt to set up a market for the promo codes,
enabling them to convert them to a cash equivalent. The court
also held that the plaintiffs’ attorney fees would be determined
at a reasonableness hearing.310
In Rambarran v. Dynamic Airways, LLC,311 the court denied a
class action certification in a Montreal Convention Article 19
flight delay case. The named plaintiffs alleged they purchased
roundtrip tickets for a Christmas flight from New York to
Guyana and that the airline unreasonably delayed this and other
New York to Guyana flights in violation of Article 19. They
305 Id. at 356.
306 Id. at 350, 352–53, 356–57.
307 147 F. Supp. 3d 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
308 Id. at 126–27.
309 Id. at 133.
310 Id. at 126–28, 133–34.
311 No. 14-cv-10138 (KBF), 2015 WL 4523222, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2015).
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sought to certify two classes of passengers who experienced de-
lays on New York to Guyana flights operated by Dynamic. The
court denied the motion primarily because of failure to establish
typicality and predominance. Plaintiffs tried to avoid the adverse
decision by filing what the court described as an “eleventh-hour,
59th-minute motion to compel discovery” for the purpose of
putting together the requisite factual record in response to de-
fendant’s opposition.312
The court also denied certification for the “unusual” reason
that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the adequacy requirement for class
certification. Its proposed class counsel was found to have
lacked the qualifications to litigate such a case as the class ac-
tion. He “used an incorrect legal standard on the motion, failed
to recognize plaintiffs’ burden and that this burden [wa]s dis-
tinct from and unrelated to any burden under the Montreal
Convention”; he “failed to assemble the minimal factual record
necessary” to show that the Rule 23 requirements were satisfied;
and he “failed to assemble from his own clients necessary factual
materials or to timely file a motion to compel discovery or seek
an extension of the class certification briefing schedule based
on the need to obtain additional evidence.”313 Nor was his effort
to serve as class counsel helped by the undisputed facts
presented by the airline: that the plaintiff verbally threatened
the gate agents in a loud and abusive manner and stated, “I’m a
big time U.S. lawyer and we’re going to sue the hell out of Dy-
namic and make sure they never fly to this country again.”314 His
outburst caused “such chaos that the Port Authority Police were
called.”315 Worse yet, the airline’s submission showed that the
named plaintiff had been disbarred in New York for mismanage-
ment of client escrow funds, and he had even pleaded guilty to
concealing a person from arrest, a felony.316
XI. INSURANCE
A. COMPULSORY INSURANCE DOCTRINE
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Professional Aircraft Line Service317
(PALS), Northwest had previously taken a default judgment
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id. at *3.
315 Id.
316 Id. at *1–3.
317 776 F.3d 575 (8th Cir. 2015).
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against the defendant, a company that, under contract, serviced
Northwest’s aircraft at McCarran Airport in Las Vegas. PALS
had five million dollars in liability insurance, as required by the
local government in Nevada. Northwest brought suit against
PALS, which failed to notify its insurer. Northwest thereupon
took a default judgment. The insurer subsequently filed a de-
claratory judgment action, alleging it had no duty to provide
coverage because of PALS’s failure to cooperate or provide no-
tice of the judgment. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment against the insurer, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. It
applied the compulsory insurance doctrine, holding that the in-
surer could not rely on defenses it would otherwise have against
the insured, such as failure to cooperate or provide notice,
where the licensing authority requires insurance for the public’s
protection. The court acknowledged that the doctrine was ordi-
narily applied in cases arising from mandatory automobile liabil-
ity insurance, but the court held that the same reasons
supported its application here.318
B. RIPENESS OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION
In Quest Aviation, Inc. v. NationAir Insurance Agencies, Inc.,319
plaintiff Quest had been sued in state court for three wrongful
death claims, alleging negligence as a charter operator. Quest
had purchased an aviation policy with a three million dollar per
occurrence policy limit and a general liability policy with a
twenty million dollar per occurrence limit. The wrongful death
claims sought in excess of three million dollars. Quest brought a
declaratory judgment proceeding against the broker who pro-
cured the insurance policies, alleging that Quest did not under-
stand that the general liability policy contained an aviation
exclusion and that it would have acted differently had it known.
Defendant broker moved to dismiss, asserting that the action
was not ripe because it was purely hypothetical whether plaintiff
would even be liable for more than its three million dollar limit
of its aviation policy. The court disagreed, holding that such an
action was ripe because Quest faced a “legitimate risk” of an ex-
cess award. The court rejected the insurer’s contention that
Quest had failed to show an actual injury because it was pres-
ently being defended and had not been held liable for an excess
judgment, but the court held that in a declaratory judgment
318 Id. at 576–77, 582.
319 No. 1:14-CV-01025-RAL, 2015 WL 1622031, at *1 (D.S.D. Apr. 10, 2015).
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proceeding, it was sufficient to show the risk of excess liability. It
also held that a declaratory judgment proceeding was appropri-
ate when the ongoing state proceeding was not a parallel action,
raised different issues, and served a useful purpose.320
C. LIFE INSURANCE
In Williams v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh,321
plaintiff’s husband died as a result of a pulmonary embolism
brought about by deep vein thrombosis (DVT) during twenty-
eight hours of international flights. The widow sought recovery
under a life insurance policy purchased by her husband’s em-
ployer, under which he was eligible for a one million dollar acci-
dental death benefit if injured while traveling by air. The trial
court granted summary judgment to the insurer on the basis
that the death did not result from an “accident . . . external to
the body” as required by the policy.322
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the term “accident” was am-
biguous and that the “external to the body” requirement was
satisfied because the death resulted from circumstances that
originated outside his body. However, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the policy endorsement “d[id] not turn on whether
‘unexpected or unintended harm arose from an external cause
during passenger air travel’ . . . but on whether there were exter-
nal, harm-causing circumstances that were themselves unexpected
and unintended.”323 The decedent was not “prevented from
moving around the planes, drinking fluids, or taking other mea-
sures to minimize the risk of DVT,” and “[t]here was no re-
ported intervention by airline personnel that could have
affected [his] physical well-being.”324 Therefore, the court con-
cluded no “person of average intelligence and experience”
would find that he died “as a direct result of an unintended,
unanticipated accident that is external to the body.”325 Moreover, the
court concluded that, as “popularly understood,” an accident is
an “unexpected occurrence separate from the harm that results
320 Id. at *1–7.
321 792 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2015).
322 Id. at 1137.
323 Id. at 1141 (citations omitted).
324 Id.
325 Id.
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from it.”326 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment to the insurer.327
In Florida Tube Corp. v. MetLife Insurance Co. of Connecticut,328
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment to
MetLife on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to provide
satisfactory evidence of death. The beneficiaries claimed that
the insured took off in his airplane from the Dominican Repub-
lic, going to his family’s home in Puerto Rico, but never com-
pleted the flight. Neither the wreckage nor the body was found.
The pilot’s son obtained a death certificate from the Dominican
Republic, which wrongly listed the date of death as five days
before the date he took off. The son later filed a death claim
form that also incorrectly listed the date of death. Due to con-
cerns about the authenticity of the second death certificate, the
Dominican Republic officials formed a commission to investi-
gate and report on its accuracy and later declared the death cer-
tificate “full of irregularities.”329 MetLife initiated its own
investigation and failed to find any evidence of location or sta-
tus. The NTSB report described the alleged accident in unclear
terms and did not name the pilot, stating only that the airplane
“presumably collided with coastal water,” and “[t]he pilot . . .
[is] presumed decesased [sic]; the airplane is presumed de-
stroyed.”330 MetLife concluded there was insufficient evidence
of his death. The court held that the beneficiaries had failed to
provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the unambiguous require-
ments of the policy, which required “a copy of a certified decree
of a court of a competent jurisdiction as to the finding of death;
a written statement by a medical doctor who attended the de-
ceased; or any other proof satisfactory to us.”331 Thus, it was within
MetLife’s discretion to decide that the circumstantial evidence
of his death was unsatisfactory.332
326 Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Ansett Austl. Ltd., 383 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the death of an airline passenger as a result of DVT was not acci-
dental under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention)).
327 Id. at 1139–42.
328 603 F. App’x 904 (11th Cir. 2015).
329 Id. at 906.
330 Id. (alterations in original).
331 Id. at 907 (emphasis in original).
332 Id. at 906–08.
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XII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Johnson v. United States,333 a criminal case with potential im-
plications for civil punitive damages claims, the Supreme Court
held that the imposition of an increased criminal sentence
under the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.334 The Court
noted that the Due Process Clause protects against deprivations
of life, liberty, or property “under a criminal law so vague that it
fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it pun-
ishes . . . or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforce-
ment.”335 A handful of cases so far have extended it to civil
claims.336 The Court noted that “[t]he prohibition of vagueness
in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized requirement, consonant
alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of
law,’ and a statute that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of due
process.’”337 These principles apply both to statutes “defining el-
ements of crimes” and to “statutes fixing sentences.”338 The stat-
ute requires a “categorical approach” to determine whether a
particular criminal statute involves burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves the use of explosives, or “otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-
other.”339 Under the categorical approach, the court must assess
“whether a crime qualifies as a violent felony ‘in terms of how
the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individ-
ual offender might have committed it on a particular occa-
sion.’”340 The Court concluded that the residual clause was
unconstitutionally vague: first, it left “grave uncertainty about
how to estimate the risk posed by a crime. It tie[d] the judicial
assessment of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a
crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements.”341 For ex-
ample, witness tampering might involve offering a bribe or mak-
ing violent threats to a witness. Second, the residual clause left
uncertainty as to the amount of risk required for a crime to con-
333 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
334 Id. at 2555.
335 Id. at 2556.
336 See Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015); Mosley v. City of
Wickliffe, No. 1:14-CV-934, 2015 WL 9304733, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2015).
337 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556–57 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
338 Id. at 2557 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)).
339 Id. (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)).
340 Id. (citing Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008)).
341 Id.
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stitute a violent felony and forced courts to interpret “serious
potential risk” in light of hypothetical circumstances surround-
ing the four enumerated crimes.342 Even though there are some
circumstances in which criminal violations of such laws clearly
fall within the statute, the court noted that its prior holdings
contradict the theory that this is sufficient to render a vague pro-
vision constitutional: “[f]or instance, we have deemed a law
prohibiting grocers from charging an ‘unjust or unreasonable
rate’ void for vagueness—even though charging someone a
thousand dollars for a pound of sugar would surely be unjust
and unreasonable.”343 The Court further noted that, generally,
“we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the
application of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to
real-world conduct; ‘the law is full of instances where a man’s
fate depends on his estimating rightly . . . some matter of de-
gree.’”344 However, the residual clause “requires application of
the ‘serious potential risk’ standard to an idealized ordinary case
of the crime.”345 The “elements necessary to determine the im-
aginary ideal are uncertain both in nature and degree of effect,”
and this inquiry thereby offers “significantly less predictability
than one ‘[t]hat deals with the actual, not . . . imaginary[,] con-
dition other than the facts.’”346
XIII. AIRPORTS AND NUISANCE
City of Dallas v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,347 involved “musical chairs”
over the limited number of gates at Love Field Airport in Dallas,
Texas, giving rise to disputes between Southwest, Delta, and
American concerning the City’s daunting task of allocating gates
with regard to (1) the constraints of a unique federal law re-
stricting interstate flights to and from Love Field; (2) lease
agreements with the airlines; (3) vague contractual obligations
in a “five party agreement” between the City of Dallas, the City
of Fort Worth (collectively, DFW), the DFW Airport Board,
Southwest, and American; and (4) the absence of the airlines’
342 Id. at 2558.
343 Id. at 2561 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89
(1921)).
344 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377
(1913)).
345 Id.
346 Id. (quoting Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223
(1914)).
347 No. 3:15-CV-2069-K, 2016 WL 98604, at *1–3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016).
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“exclusive use” of gates. Instead, it provided for “preferential”
use of certain gates, without defining what that meant. Delta
sought “accommodation” to permit it to use gates; the other air-
lines refused. The DOT told the City that it should accommo-
date Delta, but the City was unable to obtain voluntary
accommodation from the airlines and asked the court to decide.
The court granted Delta temporary injunctive relief, finding
that the threatened injury to Delta by being removed from the
airport would include damage to reputation, name, brand,
goodwill, and monetary harm, and it would constitute a disser-
vice to the public. By contrast, the court found that Southwest
was unlikely to succeed on the merits and could not show irrepa-
rable harm. Even though Southwest had paid $120 million to
sublease the two gates at issue, that did not convert its “preferen-
tial use” into “exclusive use,” and the monetary loss did not
cause irreparable harm.348
In Lewis v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,349 plaintiffs brought nui-
sance claims against Bell, seeking damages, a temporary injunc-
tion, and a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs alleged private
nuisance, based upon the flight path used by Bell in operating
its helicopter training academy at a private helicopter pad.
Plaintiffs lived approximately a half-mile from the helicopter
pad. They alleged that Bell’s training staff began to adopt a
flight path persistently to the east of plaintiffs’ western fence
line and in very close proximity to their home, typically begin-
ning at 7:30 a.m. and continuing unceasingly until at least 8:00
p.m., sometimes as late as 11:30 p.m. The training schedule and
flight path resulted in flights coming near the home approxi-
mately every five minutes, depending on how many were in the
air at any given time.350
Bell contended that the claims were preempted “because the
United States government ‘has exclusive sovereignty of airspace
in the United States.’”351 The trial court denied plaintiffs’ re-
quest for a temporary injunction and subsequently granted sum-
mary judgment for Bell. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed,
finding that the claim for injunctive relief was preempted. The
Federal Aviation Act declares that the government of the United
States “has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United
348 Id. at *1–3, *6, *14.
349 No. 02-14-00065-CV, 2015 WL 3542887, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug.
6, 2015, pet. denied).
350 Id.
351 Id.
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States.”352 It further empowers the administrator of the FAA “to
develop plans ‘for the use of navigable airspace’” and to assign
“the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft
and the efficient use of airspace,” as well to “prescribe air traffic
regulations on the flight of the aircraft.”353 Bell provided evi-
dence that the training flights took place in Class D airspace and
pointed out that “the federal government has set up regulations
to govern flight in that space. The[ ] regulations and statutory
provisions indicate[d] that the federal government ha[d] exclu-
sive sovereignty over assigning the use of United States airspace”
to use that airspace efficiently, as well as to protect individuals
and properties on the ground.354 The court cited City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc.355 for the proposition that federal
law preempts local attempts to use flight path regulation to ad-
dress aircraft noise. Therefore, a trial court order enjoining a
particular flight in that airspace would be regulating in the field
occupied exclusively by the federal government.356
The court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that federal field
preemption did not apply because the flights at issue were
purely intrastate, noting that under Burbank, when the federal
government regulates flight paths, no state government may also
do so. Plaintiffs argued that Bell was free to change its flight
paths because it had done so in the past to accommodate plain-
tiffs’ complaints and that therefore injunctive relief did not nec-
essarily impinge upon federal sovereignty. The court disagreed,
noting that “whether a new flight path is possible is not relevant”
in deciding whether the trial court may grant injunctive relief.357
Rather, “the question is whether, as a remedy for nuisance, a
Texas court has the authority to compel the new flight path
through the application of state law. The answer to that ques-
tion is no.”358 However, the court held that Bell had failed to
establish that plaintiffs’ claim for monetary damages was also
preempted. The fact that the court could not order Bell to fol-
low a particular path for its training flights because it lacked au-
thority to control what happens in Class D airspace did not
necessarily prevent plaintiffs from recovering damages for Bell’s
352 Id. at *6.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
356 Id. (citing City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 625–26).
357 Id.
358 Id.
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flights, to the extent those flights created a nuisance. Accord-
ingly, the court reversed as to plaintiffs’ claim for monetary
damages until and unless Bell carried its burden to establish that
the nuisance damages claim was also preempted.359
In Anne Arundel County v. Bell,360 the county adopted a com-
prehensive zoning plan. Two districts in the county included the
majority of the property in the vicinity of Baltimore-Washington
International Thurgood Marshall Airport, as well as all the prop-
erty in the county along the Baltimore-Washington Parkway cor-
ridor. The comprehensive zoning plan altered the previous
zoning classifications of 264 of 59,045 parcels or lots. Property
owners and community organizations challenged the county’s
actions. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the landown-
ers did not have standing to challenge the comprehensive plan
because adoption of the plan was a legislative rather than an
adjudicative action. Nor did the landowners have taxpayer
standing, which is limited to claims of illegal or ultra vires ac-
tions by governmental entities.361
In Friends of the East Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town Of East
Hampton,362 airport users challenged the validity of local regula-
tions that established curfews for the airport and additional re-
strictions on “noisy aircraft,” prohibiting noisy aircraft from
using the airport more than twice per week from May through
September. Plaintiffs claimed that these local regulations were
preempted by the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982
(AAIA) and the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990
(ANCA).363 In 2005, following previous litigation after the
Town’s acceptance of an FAA Airport Improvement grant, the
FAA settled with the Committee to Stop Airport Expansion and
agreed not to enforce ANCA noise and access restrictions unless
the Town wished to remain eligible for future grants of federal
funding. The court acknowledged federal preemption “over the
regulation of aircraft and airspace, subject to a more ‘limited
role for local airport proprietors in regulating noise levels at
their airports.’”364 This “ ‘proprietor exception’ . . . permits a
359 Id. at *2, *6–9, *11.
360 113 A.3d 639 (Md. 2015).
361 Id. at 643–44, 667.
362 152 F. Supp. 3d 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
363 Id. at 96–97 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 47101–47131 (Supp. 2013); 49 U.S.C.
§§ 47521–47533 (Supp. 2013)).
364 Id. at 108 (quoting Nat’l Helicopter Corp. of Am. v. City of N.Y., 137 F.3d
81, 88 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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local municipality, acting in its proprietary capacity, as opposed
to its police power, to adopt ‘reasonable, nonarbitrary and non-
discriminatory regulations of noise and other environmental
concerns at the local level.’”365 The court found that the plain-
tiffs did not specifically allege that the local curfew laws were
unreasonable or arbitrary and that plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate that the curfews posed any safety risk. However, it found
that the “One-Trip Rule” was drastic and that there was no indi-
cation that a less restrictive measure would alleviate the noise
concern. Accordingly, the court issued a preliminary injunction
against the One-Trip Rule but denied it as to the curfew rules.366
In re Flyboy Aviation Properties, LLC367 arose from an escalating
dispute between neighboring property owners. Plaintiff was the
owner of the Mathis Airport; defendant was a permissive user of
one of the hangars at the airport. Through a series of events,
they became hostile and sued each other for trespass, nuisance,
and more for the various slings and arrows they inflicted upon
each other. The bankruptcy judge found that each of them had
committed trespass, awarded nominal damages, and allowed de-
fendant an unsecured bankruptcy claim of $600.368
In Pofolk Aviation Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transportation for
State,369 the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the authority of the
state Department of Transportation Airport Division to impose
landing fees, rejecting a tour operator’s contention that a state
statute limited the discretion of the state agency to impose such
fees.370
In DBT Yuma, L.L.C. v. Yuma County Airport Authority,371 the
Arizona Supreme Court rejected plaintiff’s attempt to render
Yuma County vicariously responsible for the breach of an air-
port sublease by the Yuma County Airport Authority. Plaintiff
relied on a state statute that made a nonprofit corporation
(lessee) a “body politic and corporate,” claiming that this made
it an agent or instrumentality of the County and, thus, rendered
the County responsible for the Authority’s breach of the sub-
365 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting British Airways Bd. v. Port
Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 1977)).
366 Id. at 104–05, 109–10.
367 525 B.R. 510 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2015).
368 Id. at 517–23, 530–31.
369 354 P.3d 436 (Haw. 2015).
370 Id. at 437.
371 361 P.3d 379 (Ariz. 2015).
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lease.372 The court rejected the argument, holding that statutory
designations such as those used in the statute did not make the
Authority an agent of the County.373
XIV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Twiqbal
In Cheramie v. Panther Helicopters Inc.,374 plaintiff was injured in
a helicopter crash in the Gulf of Mexico. Defendant operated
the helicopter to transport employees of an oil and gas company
to an offshore oil platform. As a preliminary matter, the court
determined that the federal maritime law applied to the claim
because the sinking of an aircraft in navigable waters was the
type of incident that poses more than a fanciful risk to commer-
cial shipping. Furthermore, the crash occurred in the Gulf of
Mexico, which constituted navigable waters. The court ruled
that the complaint failed to allege when or how the engine man-
ufactured by defendant became defective. Because of the failure
to allege an essential element in this product liability claim, the
court dismissed the claim with leave to amend.375
B. DISCOVERY
Tyer v. Southwest Airlines, Co.376 arose from a discovery dispute
over post-accident photos of the plaintiff. Plaintiff, a disabled
veteran and retired police officer, alleged she sustained a seri-
ous back injury as the result of a fall during boarding. Southwest
requested production of all post-accident photos of plaintiff.
The court agreed, noting that “[w]here a plaintiff alleges that a
defendant has caused her personal injuries, she places her phys-
ical condition at issue.”377 Therefore, post-injury photos of plain-
tiff were relevant and discoverable. However, the court also held
that plaintiff was not required to produce other photos that did
not depict plaintiff. It also held that if there were any responsive
photos that depict any “intimate or other highly sensitive mat-
ter,” plaintiff could withhold them provided she produce a log
372 Id. at 380 (citing A.R.S. §§ 24-8424(A)(1), (3) (2011)).
373 Id. at 380–83.
374 No. 14-1597, 2015 WL 693221, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 2015).
375 Id. at *1–4.
376 No. 14-CV-62899-BLOOM/VALLE, 2015 WL 4537250, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July
27, 2015).
377 Id. at *2.
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listing the photos and detailing the specific reason why they are
being withheld.378
C. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
In Bouret-Echevarrı´a v. Caribbean Aviation Maintenance Corp.,379
plaintiffs brought a wrongful death product liability action
against Robinson Helicopter Company and a negligent mainte-
nance claim against Caribbean Aviation Maintenance Corp. De-
fendants obtained a defense verdict at trial. Plaintiffs contended
that prior to jury deliberations, plaintiff’s counsel “received a
confidential settlement offer of $3.5 million, comprised of $3
million from one defendant and $500,000 from another defen-
dant.”380 Defendants each disputed aspects of this assertion.
However, sixteen months after the trial, plaintiff filed a motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), seeking an evi-
dentiary hearing to assess an allegation that suggested that the
jury decided against plaintiff because the jury was aware that she
had rejected a $3.5 million settlement offer. Plaintiff’s affidavit
stated that her attorney told her that one of the expert witnesses
used by plaintiff had been informed by an employer of one of
the jurors that the jury decided against plaintiff because they
were aware that she rejected the $3.5 million settlement offer.
The trial court denied the motion without holding an eviden-
tiary hearing. It concluded this evidence was too tenuous to jus-
tify such a hearing because the affidavits were insufficient “to
push [p]laintiff’s claims beyond the daunting threshold re-
quired by Rule 60(b),” and that if the rule were otherwise, the
court would potentially be “required in any civil case to grant an
evidentiary hearing” based on mere rumors and regardless of
how much time had passed since judgment.381
The First Circuit reversed, concluding that the motion was
timely, that the trial court should have assumed the truth of the
allegations for purposes of deciding whether to hold an eviden-
tiary hearing, and that such allegations required such a hearing.
The court noted that motions brought under Rule 60(b)(6)
were subject to a “reasonable” time limit depending upon the
circumstances of the case. It held that the trial court erred by
measuring the delay from entry of the judgment rather than
378 Id. at *1–2.
379 784 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2015).
380 Id. at 40.
381 Id. at 40–41.
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from the time that appellants first learned of the allegations of
jury misconduct (less than four months before filing the mo-
tion). The four-month period was a reasonable delay after being
put on notice of the potential claim. It also held that if the jury
was aware of and based its decision on knowledge of a confiden-
tial settlement offer, that decision would violate due process.




In Wells v. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc.,383 plaintiff brought a
product liability suit against Robinson for manufacturing a de-
fective product that caused harm. Robinson moved to exclude
all evidence of other accidents because they involved different
circumstances, models, ages of helicopters, and pilot skill levels.
However, the court held that most of the other accidents were
sufficiently similar to be admissible. The court noted that under
Fifth Circuit law, evidence of similar accidents occurring under
substantially similar conditions and involving substantially simi-
lar components may be probative of defective design. It ex-
plained that such evidence can also be relevant to defendant’s
notice, the magnitude of the danger involved, the defendant’s
ability to correct a known defect, the lack of safety for intended
uses, the strength of the product, the standard of care, and cau-
sation. The court also noted that the “‘substantially similar’ stan-
dard is lowered to ‘reasonable similarity’ when other accidents
are introduced to show that the defendant was on notice of the
defect when it sold the product to the plaintiff.”384 Further, any
differences in the circumstances surrounding the occurrences
“go merely to the weight to be given the evidence.”385 However,
the court deferred ruling on evidence of accidents in Northern
Ireland and Alaska, concluding that although the product and
the allegedly defective part weighed in favor of inclusion, the
occupancy and weight of these helicopters at the time of the
accidents might constitute conditions sufficiently distinct as to
382 Id. at 43–45, 49–50.
383 Nos. 3:12-CV-564-CWR-FKB, 3:12-CV-613-CWR-FKB, 2015 WL 4066303, at
*1 (S.D. Miss. July 2, 2015).
384 Id. (citing Jackson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1993)).
385 Id. (quoting Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1083
(5th Cir. 1986)).
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warrant their exclusion and reserved admissibility determina-
tions for trial.386
B. EXPERTS
Dudley Flying Service, Inc. v. AG Air Maintenance Services, Inc.387
arose out of an engine failure of a Pratt & Whitney engine on
plaintiff’s “cropduster” airplane, allegedly from the fracture of a
turbine blade that led to secondary fractures of other blades.
Defendant maintained the aircraft. Plaintiff claimed that defen-
dant failed to perform inspections that Pratt recommended be
conducted every 200 hours after 4,000 hours of operation, and
the engine had over 4,900 hours at the time of the incident.
Plaintiff brought a challenge of the admissibility of the testi-
mony of defendant’s metallurgist, who claimed that fatigue
cracks propagate in such a short period of time that they are
unlikely to be discovered during prior inspections. Plaintiff con-
tended that the opinion of defendant’s metallurgist was pre-
mised on an erroneous assumption—that each revolution of the
turbine constituted one cycle of the engine. The court charac-
terized this as challenging “only the math in the fatigue crack
propagation calculation”388 and held that plaintiff had not made
a sufficient showing of unreliability to make the testimony
inadmissible.389
In a subsequent opinion, the court rejected plaintiff’s attempt
to call one of defendant’s experts during plaintiff’s case-in-chief
to examine him as a hostile witness, concluding that exceptional
circumstances did not exist to justify calling the opponent’s
expert.390
In Lewis v. Lycoming,391 plaintiffs brought wrongful death
claims against Lycoming arising out of a helicopter crash in En-
gland. Defendants moved to exclude the testimony of two en-
gine experts designated by plaintiffs, who planned to testify at
trial that a defectively designed or manufactured fuel servo
caused the helicopter crash. They opined that the servo suffered
from a leak that caused an overly rich fuel-air mixture to be sent
to the engine, which caused a loss of engine power. The court
386 Id. at *1–2.
387 No. 3:13-cv-00156-KGB, 2015 WL 1564960, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 8, 2015).
388 Id. at *6.
389 Id. at *3–6.
390 Dudley Flying Serv., Inc. v. Ag Air Maint. Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00156-
KGB, 2015 WL 1757886, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 17, 2015).
391 No. 11-6475, 2015 WL 3444088, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2015).
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denied defendants’ motion, concluding that the testing on
which they based their opinions was sufficiently reliable for pur-
poses of admissibility. The experts “conducted or reviewed sev-
eral tests of the subject fuel servo and an exemplar servo . . .
[and] further reviewed a [computed tomography] scan of the
subject fuel servo.”392 Defendants contended the testing was not
reliable because it was conducted “some three years after the
accident and was inconsistent with the findings of a post-acci-
dent investigation conducted in England,” but the defendants
could not “identify [any] flaws in the methodologies used.”393
Defendant also contended that the experts failed to identify any
single cause for the purported fuel leak and that the experts
decided not to perform the additional testing required to draw
such a precise conclusion because it would risk harm to the fuel
servo’s parts. The court held that these objections were insuffi-
cient to exclude the evidence.394
In a related opinion discussed in Part VIII.A., the court
granted Lycoming’s motion to strike supplemental affidavits of
two of plaintiff’s experts, which plaintiff had submitted three
months after the deadline for expert disclosures.395 Plaintiffs
contended that the affidavits merely expounded on the previ-
ously provided opinions of the experts. However, the court
noted that the experts had not previously offered any conclu-
sions as to when an alternative servo design was available and
held that new or contradictory opinions are not proper subject
matter for supplemental disclosures. Accordingly, the court
granted Lycoming’s motion to strike.396 Federal courts increas-
ingly are sanctioning parties who fail to make timely expert dis-
closures as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(2)(A); Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) requires
exclusion of such evidence unless the failure was substantially
justified or is harmless.397
Birtciel v. XL Specialty Insurance398 was a coverage lawsuit, aris-
ing when decedent’s breathing tube became dislodged in the
392 Id. at *3.
393 Id.
394 Id. at *1–3.
395 Lewis v. Lycoming, No. 11-6475, 2015 WL 3444220, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 29,
2015).
396 Id. at *4–5.
397 See, e.g., Maryea v. Dowaliby, No. 13-cv-318-LM, 2015 WL 7756005, at *1
(D.N.H. Dec. 1, 2015); Rusha v. Edelman, No. 13-13644, 2015 WL 5275126, at *6
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2015).
398 No. 2:13-cv-02511 JWS, 2015 WL 518812, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2015).
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course of being transported in a JetArizona air ambulance.
JetArizona ceased doing business shortly after Bertciel’s death,
so no one forwarded the summons and complaint to XL Spe-
cialty, the insurer of JetArizona, and plaintiff had taken a default
against one of JetArizona’s employees. XL Specialty then denied
coverage on the basis that the claim did not allege claims arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the aircraft. Plain-
tiff thereupon obtained a default judgment of $4 million against
XL Specialty’s insured, JetArizona. In the coverage litigation, XL
Specialty moved to exclude the testimony of plaintiff’s expert
witness, a doctor who opined on the fault of a co-defendant
cause of death in the prior action, on the ground that his pro-
posed testimony in the coverage action was contrary to the posi-
tions he had taken in the prior case. The court concluded that
the testimony was not inconsistent. The prior testimony “ruled
in” one set of circumstances that led to the death, but had not
“ruled out” the events at issue in the coverage action.399
C. NTSB REPORTS
Helicopters, Inc. v. NTSB400 arose out of a helicopter crash in
Seattle in which the petitioner operated the helicopter. Helicop-
ters, Inc. took issue with some omissions from the NTSB’s fac-
tual report and wrote to the NTSB requesting it to rescind the
factual report and refrain from releasing the report until Heli-
copters, Inc. corrected the errors. The NTSB replied that the
factual report was only one part of the investigation and that it
would later issue a final accident report that would contain all of
the relevant facts and a detailed analysis, as well as the probable
cause of the accident. On appeal, the court held that the
NTSB’s denial of a petition to reopen an investigation did not
constitute a reviewable final “order,” as required by 49 U.S.C.
§1153(a), because it did not create any legal repercussions for
the petitioner. The court agreed with the NTSB that to deter-
mine if the NTSB had published an “inaccurate” report would
require the court to review the accuracy of the report before the
NTSB itself had the opportunity to decide whether to change it.
Nor could the court presume that the NTSB’s final report would
fail to correct any inaccuracies, so petitioner’s claim of harm was
speculative.401
399 Id. at *1–4.
400 803 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2015).
401 Id. at 844–46.
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In Paulsboro Derailment Cases,402 plaintiffs submitted portions of
the NTSB Accident Report as part of the opposition to defend-
ants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants moved to
strike the NTSB report excerpts included in plaintiffs’ opposi-
tion. The court cited the plain language of the statute and regu-
lations—that no part of the accident report can be admitted
into evidence—as meaning what it says. It rejected plaintiff’s ar-
gument that the factual portions of the NTSB report should nev-
ertheless be admissible. The court therefore ordered plaintiffs
to refile their opposition papers without reference to the NTSB
report.403
However, in Seegar v. Anticola,404 the court distinguished be-
tween “a report of the [NTSB],” which is defined in 49 C.F.R.
§ 835.2 as “the report containing the [NTSB]’s determinations,
including a probable cause of an accident, issued either as a nar-
rative report or in a computer format (‘briefs’ of accidents),”
and factual accident reports, “which are ‘report[s] containing
the results of the investigator’s investigation of the accident.’”405
Factual accident reports “are not ‘report[s] of the [NTSB]’ and
are admissible.”406 The court held that the statute excludes evi-
dence of the former but not the latter. Accordingly, the court
permitted plaintiffs’ use of the pilot-operator accident report
but not the pages containing the NTSB probable cause report
and the NTSB’s brief of the accident.407
D. JUDICIAL NOTICE
A decision in the Seventh Circuit raised important questions
concerning the kinds of evidence courts can consider outside
the record. In Rowe v. Gibson,408 a non-aviation civil rights case,
plaintiff was a prisoner in the Indiana state prison system who
had been diagnosed with reflux. The prison doctor recom-
mended Zantac, to be taken twice a day with meals. This worked
for about a year, and plaintiff was permitted to keep the Zantac
in his cell. But, without explanation, he was told he could not
keep the pills and they could only be administered at 9:30 a.m.
402 No. 13-784 (RBK/KMW), 2015 WL 4138950, at *1 (D.N.J. July 9, 2015).
403 Id. at *1–2.
404 Nos. 13-2030-LPS, 13-2031-LPS, 2015 WL 1149537, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 12,
2015).
405 Id. at *3.
406 Id.
407 Id.
408 798 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015).
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and 9:30 p.m., even though his meals were at 4 a.m. and 4 p.m.
Plaintiff claimed that the prison’s unjustified change to his regi-
men violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The trial
court granted summary judgment to the defendant but the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed. Judge Posner’s decision cited numerous
sources of medical information obtained from, and citing to,
the Internet.409 This triggered a concurrence by one judge, who
said that the same result could be reached without looking be-
yond the record of the case.410 It also triggered a strong dissent
from Judge Hamilton.411 Together, the three opinions provide
important and differing views of the court’s willingness to take
judicial notice of such information in an era of vast quantities of
information readily available from the Internet.
XVI. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA,412 the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld
the FAA’s interpretive ruling that a web-based service, through
which private recreational pilots could share expenses with pas-
sengers who were also members of the organization, was acting
as a common carrier, and therefore, pilots of such aircraft would
be required to hold commercial certificates. Flytenow “facilitates
connections between pilots and ‘general aviation enthusiasts’
who pay a share of the flight’s expenses in exchange for passage
on a route predetermined by the pilot.”413 The court examined
the regulatory structure, the distinctions between private and
common carriage, and the differing standards between recrea-
tional and commercial operations. The FAA “treats flight-shar-
ing services as ‘common carriage.’ Under the FAA’s definition
of ‘common carriage,’ flight-sharing services meet the compen-
sation element of the common[ ]carriage definition because ex-
pense sharing is compensation.”414 Flytenow also contended that
the FAA’s interpretation was a “significant deviation” from the
past and could not be effective until and unless the FAA promul-
gated new rules under formal rule-making procedures. How-
ever, the court noted that the Supreme Court had recently
409 Id. at 623–32.
410 Id. at 635 (Rovner, J., concurring).
411 Id. at 635–44 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
412 808 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
413 Id. at 885.
414 Id. at 888 (emphasis in original).
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abrogated the circuit’s earlier decision on which Flytenow’s ar-
gument was based.415
The plaintiff in Ege v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security416
was a pilot for Emirates Airlines. He sought review of an order of
the TSA that prohibited him from “flying to, from, or over the
United States.”417 He claimed that TSA’s prohibition was based
on his alleged inclusion on the No Fly List and sought either
removal from that list or a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
He sued both the TSA and the Department of Homeland Secur-
ity (DHS).418
Ege experienced travel issues in 2009 and submitted an on-
line inquiry to DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, the ad-
ministrative review system for those who claim to have been
improperly or unfairly delayed or prohibited from boarding an
aircraft. TSA reviewed the inquiry and said that any appropriate
changes or corrections had been made. However, Ege’s
problems while traveling persisted, so he contacted TSA again.
Subsequently TSA sent him another letter stating it had con-
ducted a review of any applicable records and consultations with
other federal agencies as appropriate and determined no
changes were warranted and also informed him he could ap-
peal. He filed an appeal, but the TSA issued its final order up-
holding the initial agency decision and indicated he could seek
review by a U.S. Court of Appeals under 49 U.S.C. § 46110.419
Ege petitioned the court for review under that statute, which
provides jurisdiction to review orders issued by the DHS, TSA,
and FAA. However, the court sua sponte asked the parties to sub-
mit supplemental briefs addressing whether the court had juris-
diction. Both parties submitted briefing saying that the court
had jurisdiction to decide his claim under § 46110. However,
the court concluded it did not have Article III jurisdiction. It
concluded that his injury must have been “fairly traceable to the
challenged action[s] of the [TSA or DHS], and not the result of
the independent action of some third party not before the
court” and that “it must be likely, as opposed to merely specula-
tive, that [his] injury will be redressed by a favorable deci-
415 Id. at 885–89 (citing Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207
(2015) (abrogating Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579
(D.C. Cir. 1997))).
416 784 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
417 Id. at 793.
418 Id. at 792–93.
419 Id.
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sion.”420 The court noted that the sole entity with the authority
to remove names from the No Fly List is the Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC) administered by the FBI. Therefore, the court
concluded that the injury could not fairly be traced to the chal-
lenged action of the TSA or DHS, the agencies before the court.
Thus, there was no standing to adjudicate the claim.421
Huerta v. Ducote422 arose from an FAA enforcement action.
Ducote held an airline transport pilot certificate. However, he
co-piloted a passenger-carrying flight on a Cessna S550 from
Mississippi to the Bahamas on June 6, 2010. On June 10, 2010,
he co-piloted the same plane from the Bahamas to Florida and
back to Mississippi, again carrying passengers. He accurately
documented the flights to the Bahamas in his personal flight
log. However, when an FAA investigator requested Ducote’s
flight record, any indication of the Bahamas flights disappeared.
Instead, there was a falsified record stating that he had piloted a
domestic flight between two airports in Mississippi, flights for
which he was qualified. Nearly two years later, the FAA issued an
emergency order of revocation of his certificate for falsifying his
flight log and for piloting a passenger-carrying flight between
the Bahamas and Florida in an aircraft for which he was not
qualified. At the hearing, he admitted these facts, but the ad-
ministrative law judge denied the FAA Administrator’s claim of
intentional falsification for the Bahamian flight on June 10,
2010. The judge reasoned that the written flight record pre-
pared for the FAA was not a “material” filing and, therefore, was
not sufficient grounds for an intentional falsification charge be-
cause, even if he had intentionally falsified it, the log book was
not a document required to be maintained. Moreover, even
though Ducote admitted the violation, the judge dismissed the
unauthorized flight charge on the basis that the count had be-
come “stale” upon dismissal of the intentional falsification
counts.423
On appeal, the NTSB affirmed on alternative grounds. It
ruled that the falsified log was a material submission that would
disqualify a pilot, but it upheld the dismissal because the Admin-
istrator had not shown intentional falsification, concluding that
420 Id. at 794–95 (alterations in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
421 Id. at 793–95; see Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012);
Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 2008).
422 792 F.3d 144 (D.C. Cir 2015).
423 Id. at 147–50.
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the judge’s findings so indicated. The NTSB also affirmed dis-
missal of the operational violation on the basis that the Adminis-
trator failed to plead the violation with sufficient specificity as to
the seriousness of the alleged violation. The NTSB concluded
that the exception to the “stale complaint rule” only applied
when the complaint “specifically pleads facts concerning a viola-
tion that unequivocally indicates a lack of qualification[,] and
the complaint must legitimately demonstrate, not merely allege,
that a lack of qualification exists.”424
The D.C. Circuit overruled the NTSB and allowed the Admin-
istrator’s Petition for Review. On the appeal, the Aircraft Own-
ers and Pilots Association (AOPA) appeared as an amicus and
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the Adminis-
trator lacked statutory standing. Standing was lacking because
the Administrator erroneously concluded that the NTSB’s appli-
cation of the stale complaint rule met the statutorily-required
“significant adverse impact” and that “judicial concurrence in
that judgment was a jurisdictional prerequisite.”425 The appel-
late court rejected the AOPA’s contention that the Administra-
tor’s determination was jurisdictional. Finally, the court held
that the nature of the inquiry at issue “defie[d] jurisdictional
treatment.”426 The text of the statute confers to the Administra-
tor, not a court, the power to decide what impact an NTSB or-
der will have on carrying out the Administrator’s duties under
the Federal Aviation Act.427
Reaching the merits, the court held that the NTSB was in er-
ror on both counts. First, the NTSB erred in placing the height-
ened pleading standard on the Administrator, which departed
severely from the regulatory text and precedent and “was ac-
companied only by the most superficial [NTSB] analysis.”428 The
stale complaint rule is enforced at the start of an administrative
proceeding through a motion to dismiss. Nothing requires the
Administrator to “demonstrate” anything at the pleading stage,
assuming the truth of the allegations rather than to require the
court unequivocal establishment. Second, the NTSB’s dismissal
of the charge that Ducote falsified his flight logs was based upon
an adverse credibility determination that the NTSB erroneously
thought the judge had made. The record was clear that no such
424 Id. at 150 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
425 Id. at 150–51.
426 Id. at 152.
427 Id. at 150–51, 156–57.
428 Id. at 153.
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credibility judgment had been made. To the contrary, the false
factual content of the record Ducote submitted to the FAA was
never in dispute, and the judge had made no such credibility
finding.429
In Joshi v. NTSB,430 the father of a pilot who died in an aircraft
accident sought to challenge the probable cause findings of the
NTSB. He hired an engineering firm to reconstruct the accident
and petitioned the NTSB to reconsider its probable cause re-
port. The NTSB determined that the engineer’s methodologies
were flawed, the conclusions were not supported by the evi-
dence, and any witness statements submitted on behalf of the
father were consistent with the NTSB’s initial report; it there-
fore denied the Petition for Reconsideration. On appeal, the
D.C. Circuit concluded there was no final agency action for it to
review because NTSB reports and denial for reconsideration
lacked the necessary “determinate consequences.” NTSB investi-
gations are used to determine what measures would best prevent
similar accidents in the future, so they are not subject to the
APA and are not performed to determine the rights or liabilities
of any person. Moreover, the reports themselves may not be ad-
mitted or used for any other purpose in civil litigation. Conse-
quently, there are no legal consequences of the NTSB’s factual
report or probable cause determinations. The petitioner argued
that the reports can result in reputational harm, financial harm,
emotional harm, and informational harm. However, the court
responded saying that even if this were true, these are “practical
consequences, not legal harms that can transform the [NTSB
report] into a final agency order,” thereby triggering jurisdic-
tion.431 Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.432
XVII. RES JUDICATA
In Medina-Padilla v. Piedmont Aviation Services, Inc.,433 plaintiff
initially brought a direct action against U.S. Aviation Underwrit-
ers, Inc. and U.S. Aircraft Insurance Group, seeking to recover
for breaches of passenger and charter agreements by an insured
who subsequently went bankrupt. The court dismissed those
429 Id. at 153–56.
430 791 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 994 (Jan. 25, 2016).
431 Id. at 11–12.
432 Id. at 9–13.
433 No. 14-1048 (DRD), 2015 WL 1033918, at *1 (D.P.R. Mar. 10, 2015), aff’d,
815 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2016).
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claims, holding that the insurance policy covered only tort liabil-
ity and not contract claims. Plaintiffs then filed a new action,
alleging a tort based on the same underlying acts, but the court
again dismissed the claim based on res judicata. The court fol-
lowed a “transactional” approach to res judicata and concluded
that the claims were barred because they arose from the same
transaction as those in the action that had previously been
dismissed.434
XVIII. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Manufacturers Collection Co., LLC v. Precision Airmotive, LLC435
arose in the aftermath of a Pennsylvania product liability lawsuit
in which a Piper Cherokee single-engine aircraft “crashed
shortly after takeoff from an airport in Ohio, where it had
stopped to refuel.”436 The aircraft was traveling from Wisconsin
to Pennsylvania. Four of the five occupants, including the pilot,
were killed, and the surviving occupant suffered severe injuries.
Plaintiffs brought a product liability action against Lycoming
Engines, an operating division of AVCO Corporation, in Penn-
sylvania. A jury rendered a special verdict, finding “that AVCO
had knowingly misrepresented, concealed, or withheld required
information from the [FAA] that [was] causally related to the
harm [p]laintiffs suffered; that AVCO was negligent, and that
such negligence was a factual cause of the accident; and that
AVCO had engaged in conduct that was malicious, wanton, will-
ful[,] or oppressive, or show[ed] reckless indifference to the in-
terests of others[.]”437 It also found that the carburetor in the
accident was defective, which was a factual cause of the crash.
However, the carburetor manufacturer was not a party in the
action. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $88,700,000 in damages,
of which $24,700,000 were compensatory damages and the re-
mainder were punitive damages. AVCO’s insurers subsequently
settled with the plaintiffs and assigned the rights of recovery
from the settlement to AVCO. AVCO then assigned those rights
to Manufacturers Collection Company, LLC (MCC), a Texas-
based company formed solely for the purpose of filing an in-
demnity lawsuit against Precision in Texas.438
434 Id. at *2, *5–6.
435 No. 3:12-CV-0853-L, 2015 WL 3456620, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2015).
436 Id.
437 Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
438 Id. at *1–2.
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MCC sued Precision for indemnity, alleging that Precision, as
the manufacturer of the defective carburetor, owed a duty to
indemnify AVCO for the amounts incurred to plaintiffs in the
previous action. Precision, in turn, sought indemnity for the
costs incurred in defending the previous lawsuit. The key ques-
tion concerned whether the indemnity claim was controlled by
Pennsylvania or Texas law. The court determined that there was
an actual conflict between the indemnity laws of the two states.
Whereas Pennsylvania required a party seeking indemnity to be
“without active fault on its own part,” Texas permitted a manu-
facturer to be held “liable to the seller [of a product] regardless
of how the injury action is resolved.”439
The court determined that Pennsylvania law applied because
all but one of the plaintiffs resided in Pennsylvania. The under-
lying lawsuit was filed there, and the costs for which MCC sought
indemnification were incurred in Pennsylvania. In addition,
AVCO was headquartered in Pennsylvania and was alleged to
have manufactured the engine in that state. Although plaintiff
MCC was a Texas entity, the court concluded that the post hoc
formation of a Texas limited liability company was a “manufac-
tured contact” entitled to little if any weight and that Texas had
no actual interest in the dispute.440
Applying Pennsylvania law, the court concluded that the jury’s
findings—that AVCO knowingly misrepresented, concealed, or
withheld required information that caused the accident, that it
had engaged in malicious, wanton, and willful conduct, and that
it was 100% at fault—precluded indemnity. The court cited a
Pennsylvania case suggesting that a finding of punitive damages
should preclude a subsequent indemnity action as a matter of
law. In any event, the jury’s special verdict established that
AVCO had not merely been vicariously liable. Likewise, the
court rejected Precision’s third-party statutory indemnification
claim against AVCO because Precision did not sustain a loss in a
product liability action and was not even a party to the underly-
ing product liability action.441
In Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Arteaga,442 plaintiffs sued Bell
in Delaware, Bell’s state of incorporation, for damages arising
from a crash in Mexico. The helicopter was owned and operated
439 Id. at *8.
440 Id. at *9–10.
441 Id. at *2–4, *8–10, *12–14.
442 113 A.3d 1045 (Del. 2015).
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by a Mexican company. All of the decedents were Mexican citi-
zens and their relatives bringing suit were Mexican citizens as
well. The helicopter had been operated solely within Mexico for
more than thirty years when it crashed. Plaintiffs alleged that the
crash was caused by a defective strap fitting that was installed in
the helicopter in Mexico in 2009. Both the helicopter and the
strap fitting were designed and manufactured in Texas, where
Bell is headquartered. After the trial court denied Bell’s motion
for forum non conveniens dismissal, Bell moved to apply Mexi-
can law to the plaintiffs’ remedies. Simultaneously, plaintiffs
moved to apply the law of Texas to liability and damages. Nota-
bly, neither party requested the application of Delaware law.443
The trial court found that Texas law should apply because it
was the location where the allegedly defective part was designed
and manufactured. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed. The
majority opinion noted that “[w]hen plaintiffs choose not to sue
in the place where they were injured or where they live, or even
in the jurisdiction whose law they contend applies, but instead a
jurisdiction with no connection to the litigation, [Delaware]
trial courts should be extremely cautious not to intrude on the
legitimate interests of other sovereign states.”444 It held that Del-
aware had “no public policy interest” in the case except “to
avoid contributing to forum shopping and enmeshing itself in
unrelated litigation.”445 Although the Second Restatement pro-
vides a rebuttable presumption that the law of the place of the
injury should govern personal injury litigation, the trial court
found that the place of the crash was fortuitous and thus consid-
ered it insignificant that the crash occurred in Mexico. The Su-
preme Court disagreed. Although location of an aircraft
accident can often be fortuitous, plaintiffs “cannot claim that
the alleged injuries occurred fortuitously in their home coun-
tries.”446 “[A]ll the victims were Mexican citizens, traveling from
one Mexican state to another with jobs in Mexico,”447 and rode
in a helicopter that had been operating in Mexico since 1979, to
take a trip that was supposed to begin and end in Mexico.
443 Id. at 1047–48.
444 Id. at 1051–52.
445 Id. at 1052.
446 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
447 Id. at 1054.
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Therefore, there was nothing fortuitous about the location of
the crash and the place where they lived and worked.448
XIX. BREACH OF CONTRACT
In Coulier v. United Airlines, Inc.,449 plaintiff attempted to take
advantage of United’s “Low Fare Guarantee” that guaranteed
“[w]hen it comes to finding the lowest United[ ] fare online, we
guarantee you will find it on united.com.”450 Based on the Low
Fare Guarantee, plaintiff assumed that cheaper tickets were not
available for any of the tickets he purchased. He purchased
three one-way tickets from united.com. He later discovered that
if there were an insufficient number of tickets available in the
lowest fare class for purchase of a group of tickets, the fare for
each ticket would be increased to the next available fare cate-
gory, and the lower fare category would vanish from united.com
and all other websites selling United tickets. He contended that
he “purchased the tickets on united.com as required by the Low
Price Guarantee” but was “unable to prove that there was a
lower published price online because, contemporaneously with
selling a given ticket at the next-highest fare category when . . .
the ticket is sold in a group, United replaces the allotment of
lower fares with more expensive fares, resulting in the elimina-
tion of any available lower fares.”451 This rendered it “impossible
for him to locate the less expensive fares after he completed his
purchase[,] and it was impossible for any United representative
to find the lower fares on a publicly accessible Internet site.”452
He filed the lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated
individuals. He alleged that United “breached the contract by
failing to provide the lowest price per ticket when tickets were
purchased as a group.”453
United moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff did not satisfy
the terms and conditions of the Low Fare Guarantee, which re-
quired him to “find a fare on a different website for the exact
same travel itinerary that is at least [ten dollars] less than the
fare he paid on united.com and file a claim with United by mid-
448 Id. at 1048–52, 1054, 1060; see also Linfoot v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter
Co., No. 3:09-cv-639, 2015 WL 1190171, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2015).
449 110 F. Supp. 3d 730 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
450 Id. at 731.
451 Id. at 733.
452 Id. (citations omitted).
453 Id.
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night on the date of purchase.”454 Plaintiff claimed he was ex-
cused from performing the terms and conditions because
United made it impossible by eliminating the lower fares the
moment he purchased tickets. However, the court agreed with
United’s contention that the Low Fare Guarantee is simply an
offer for a unilateral contract. It was not a warranty for any
purchase of any ticket on United but an offer relating to
purchases made specifically on united.com. This offer could be
accepted only by purchasing a ticket on united.com; finding a
retail price online for the same flight, itinerary, and cabin that is
ten dollars lower or more than the fare purchased on the same
day; and calling the United Customer Contact Center Office
and filing a claim. Plaintiff admittedly did not take these steps
and, therefore, did not fulfill the conditions of the contract.
United also contended that plaintiff’s claim was preempted by
the ADA, but the court did not reach that issue because it found
that the claim was barred under contract law.455
In Opper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,456 the court treated Delta’s
“Best Fare Guarantee” as a warranty, which required the ticket
purchaser to find a lower fare on another website for the exact
same itinerary. Plaintiff did not provide any basis for compari-
son. Plaintiff’s interpretation of the warranty was erroneous be-
cause it viewed the warranty as making a claim about what kinds
of fares would be available. In reality, the warranty only made a
comparative claim that fares for Delta flights would be lowest on
Delta’s website.457
XX. FALSE CLAIMS ACT
In United States ex rel. Gage v. Davis S.R. Aviation, LLC,458 Gage
brought a qui tam action alleging that defendants were part of a
scheme to defraud the government by supplying non-con-
forming aircraft parts to Orion, which installed the parts on air-
craft as Northrup’s contractor, in violation of contractual or
regulatory requirements. Despite several orders from the trial
court to amend the complaint to plead the claims with specific-
ity, the court finally dismissed Gage’s third amended complaint
for failure to state a claim with adequate particularity and re-
454 Id.
455 Id. at 731–33, 736, 738 n.3.
456 No. 14-C-962, 2015 WL 94193, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 7, 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 984 (2016).
457 Id. at *2.
458 623 F. App’x 622 (5th Cir. 2015).
224 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
fused to give Gage any additional opportunities to cure the defi-
ciencies. Gage did not specifically allege that “defendants
expressly certified that parts sold to the government complied
with any statute, regulation, or contractual provision.”459 Rather,
he alleged the defendants, by selling parts to and requesting re-
imbursement from the government, implied that the parts com-
plied with certain contractual or regulatory provisions and
thereby impliedly certified their fitness. However, the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. It concluded that even if
the false certification theory applied, Gage did not plead with
sufficient particularity the necessary “who, what, when, where,
and how” of a false claim,460 and deferred deciding whether
such a claim, if properly pled, would be cognizable under the
False Claims Act.461
459 Id. at 625.
460 Id. at 625.
461 Id. at 623–25.
